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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The 'tFall Line Blockade lt of rail routes to Hampton 
Roads prior to 1860 has been blamed as a major obstacle to 
the development of the great natural harbor of Hampton 
Roads. In 1967 the Virginia legislature is faced with a 
question, the ramifications of which may have an equally 
drastic effect upon the long-range success of Virginia's 
world trade. The qUBstion is whether or not to deepen the 
James River to Richmond at a cost of about $40 million in 
federal funds. 
'tHampton Roads. 
• • with its fifty miles of shoreline 
possesses one of the largest natural harbors in the 
world. Itl The harbor is dou ble landlocked by an outer 
entrance from the Atlantic Ocean into Chesapeake Bay 
through the Virginia Capes (Cape Henry and Cape Charles, see 
Figure 1). Chesapeake Bay extends two hundred miles north, 
varying from four to forty miles in width. To reach the 
Hampton Roads piers ships enter the southern end of the Bay 
at the Capes, continue west-northwesterly for twelve miles, 
and pass between Old Point Comfort on the north and Willoughby 
Spit on the south into Hampton Roads. Inside the harbor the 
channel divides, one branch extending westward to a deep water 
IMajor t<J. R. \'lheeler, The Road to Vict?r'X, Vol. I. 
{New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 194b', p. 1. 
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Figure 1. Hampton Roads, Virginia, and environs. 
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area off the port of Newport News, the other southward into 
the Elizabeth River. The latter channel, connecting channels 
and deep water areas, and the cities of Norfolk and Ports­
mouth comprise the Port of Norfolk, as referred to here. 
lrhree Virginia rivers (James, Nansemond, and Elizabeth) and 
their tributaries flow into Chesapeake Bay via Hampton Roads. 
The entire complex of cities and the harbor within their 
boundaries are included in the general definition of Hampton 
I 
Roads. 
The preceding brief description is that of an area 
which many writers believe to be the greatest natu~al harbor 
in t he world. IfHampton Roads • • • [isJ one of the finest 
2 
land-locked harbors in the world lt ; llHampton Roads • • • is 
the world's foremost coal seaport";3 ItHampton Roads, the 
Il)t- 1I ( -Jfinest natural harbor • .., ••• This port .••. is . 
,,5
endowed with a matchless harbor. Relative advantages include 
the fact that Hampton Roads is ice free year around; is nearly 
two hundred miles nearer the Atlantic than Baltimore (near the 
l Ibid ., pp. 1, 2. 
2~eep'v'la~er (New York: Net... York Marine News Company, 
Inc., 19::;>2), p. 91. 
l. 
J ~bid., p. 92. 
4Elsie A. Stegman, Hampton Roads Guide (Norfolk: Guide 
Book Company, 1925), p. 910 
5E . O. Je\.'lTell, A Factual Stud~ of the Port of Norfolk 
(Norfolk: Norfolk Fort-Authority, 19 oT; p. l~ 
4 
inland end of Chesapeake Bay); and has generally lower costs 
of handllng import and export traffic than other Atlantic 
seaports. This latter fact is based on the nearly universal 
availability of direct rail-to-ship and ship-to-rail handling 
1
of cargoes. In addition II • • • freight rate differentials 
are lower than those of New York, Philadelphia, and Boston. lt 2 
Hampton Roads' ship repair facilities lIare not excelled by 
any other port in the country.,,3 Nine railroads serving 
Norfolk and twenty-one states have a combined mileage of over 
37,000 miles, in excess of sixteen per cent of the total 
4­United States mileage. Hampton Roads has desirable general 
characteristics (depths, restrictions, facilities, etc.) 
which compare favorably with or exceed those of other Atlantic 
ports With harbors classed as Itlarge."5 (See Table rIO) 
Has Hampton Roads, with its physical and geographical 
advantages, been successful at evolving into the greatest 
port complex campa red to at her Atlant 1c competi tors? Depend­
ing upon how one interprets statistics, Hampton Roads has 
nearly succeeded in some respects and failed in others. 
Table II indicates Hampton Roads has realized a degree of 
stABdy growth in forei.gn water-borne commerce. But a deeper 
lSteg~an, 2£. cit., pp. 89, 90, 97.
 
2Ib:id., p. 97. Confirmed in Jewell, QE. cit., Intro­
ductory letter. 
3Stegman, op. cit., p. 100. 
4J e 1tJe 11, ~. cit., P• 126. 
5World Port Index, 19f21 (third edition; \1ashington: 
U.S. Gov-ernmentPrintini~ Office, publication 150,1963), pp. 
17, 18. 
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FOREIGN \'iATER-BORNE Cor·1r'iERGE THROUGH PRINCIPAL ATLANTIC COAST PORTS 
1961-1965(inclusive) 
(The Ports of Greater Hampton Roads Annual, 1967) 
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Ea=lptO:1 Roads: 
Ir:rports . . • . 5,953 $ 347 5,888 $ 327 5,543 $ 298 5,583 $ 270 5~998 $ 276 
Exports • . . • 35,056 954 33,708 1,004 32,847 915 28,092 810 25,642 792 
Total • • • • 41,009 1,301 39,596 1,331 38,390 1,213 33,675 1,080 31..,640 1,068 
Hew York: 
L-:;.ports • • • • 47,536 5,533 41,351 5,098 39,999 4,773 38,545 4,808 34,667 4,344 
Exports • • . • 6,801 5,940 7,731 6,045 6,918 5,292 7,104 5,308 6,950 5,130 
Total • • • • 54,337 11,473 49,082 11,143 46,917 10,065 45,649 10,116 41,617 9,474
BaltD::LOre: 
Ir::J.ports • • • • 19,720 758 18,062 722 17,423 695 18,265 652 15,185 630 
Exports • • • • 5,886 684 7,178 714 6,1343 702 5,190 580 4,542 593 
Total • . • • 25,606 1,442 25,240 1,436 24,266 1~397 23,455 1,232 19,727 1.,223 
Philadelphia: 
L-:::;:o rt s • • . • 19,983 1380 17,713 787 18,051. 779 20,903 742 16,585 697 
C'"'+l...xpor"s • . •• 2,867 455 3,813 472 5,210 444 3,207 366 2,944 356 
Tota.l • • • • 22,058 1,335 21,526 1,259 23,261 1,223 24,110 1,108 19,529 1,053 
Boston: ~ 
I:~iports . • • .. 6,319 566 6,146 230 5,808 502 6,301 494 6,435 454 
Exports • • • . 598 93 1,011 121 810 94 610 88 1,025 127 
?otal • • . • 6,917 659 7,157 351 6,618 596 6,911 582 7,460 581 
Charleston: 
Ir.port6 •.••• 
Exports • • • • 
1,404 
536 
216 
117 
1,521 
610 
182 
147 
1,529 
493 
179 
112 
1,320 
392 
179 
112 
1,401 
479 
147 
123 
0' 
To'!"al • • • • 1,940 333 2,131 329 2,022 291 1,71.2 291 1,880 270 
7 
analysis of the makeup of the data in terms of exports versus 
imports, tons versus dollars, and the nature of the materials 
making up those tons (see Table III) presents an entirely 
different outlook. 
For example, of Hampton Roads f 4-1 million tons of 
foreign commerce in 1965, 35 million tons were exports; 32 
million rons of these exports were coal. Further, other 
bullrj mater ial made up a ma j ori ty of the rema ining three 
million tons of exports and nine million tons of the cumula­
tive trade. In comparison, no coal was exported by New York. 
Trade volume in terms of dollars presents an other signifi­
cant key to the differences between New York trade (nearly 
$11.5 billion) and Hampton Roads trade (about $1.3 billion). 
Even in the absence of a breakdown of commodities included 
in New York trade, the tonnage-value comparison l-Jou1d indi­
cate a 6reater economic significance of its trade picture as 
compared 1,-JJth that of Hampton Roads. ThOUGh it is not the 
purpose here to deeply evaluate the virtues of a $1.3 billion 
trade value made up nearly 77 per cent of coal comDared Hith 
an $11.5 billion trade ~luo including no coal, it can be 
assumed tha t the combined trade of Nmv York con:Jisted of 
COl1orelJy JeSE; bulky, morE-) valuable commodities. It is E,lso 
8f1fo to conclude, for the purposes of this summary, that tho 
trade of the lattor plays a tromendously greater role in t 
oconomy than the VAry unbalanced trado carried through 
8 
TABLE III 
IMPORTS AND EXPORTS THROUGH THE PORT OF HAMPTON ROADS 
BY CLASS OF COMMODITY e 
1965 (The Ports of Hampton Roads Annual, !2§Z) 
(In net tons of 2000 pounds) 
Class of Commodity Exports Imports Total 
Food and Live Animals 
Beveraees and Tobacco 
• 
· 
· · 
1,756,533 
175,930 
71,774 
59,735 
1,830,307 
235,665 
Inedible Crude Materials 
Except Fuels 
· · · · · 
626,727 1,287,128 1,913,855 
11ineral Fuels, Related 
Products, Except 
Bituminous Coal 
· · · · 
20,771 3,994, 535-lH~ 4,015,306 
Bituminous Coal • 
· · · 
31,936,689 0 31,936,689 
Animal, Vegetable Oils 
and Fats . . 
· · · · · 
59,035 14 59,049 
Chemicals (primarily 
related to fertilizers) 
Light llJanufactured Goods 
269,543 
176,443 
233,163 
273,870 
502,706 
450,313 
rc::achinery and Transport 
Equipment . . 
· · · · · 
33,954 33,054 67,008 
Nonclassified Commodities 
and Transactions 
· · · 
. . 139 0 139 
Total • 
· 
• 35,055,764 5,953,273 41,009,037 
•• Comprising mainly fuel oils (2,114,738 tons) 
and crude petroleum (1,777,692 tons). 
9 
1Hampton Roads. 
Before proceeding, other observations should not be 
overlooked. That is, comparison of 1965 exports ($5.9 
billion) and imports ($5.5 billion) for the port of New York 
indicates a near-balance of trade value. Comparatively, for 
Hampton Roads exports ($.95 billion) are nearly three times 
imports ($.35 billion) in terms of value. This emphasizes 
an extreme reliance by Hampton Roads upon one commodity 
flowing in a single direction for continuation of trade 
level. A further comparison in terms of tons reveals that 
for Hampton Roads exports are approximately six times imports, 
while the position of New York is reversed with nearly eight 
times as much tonnage in imports as in exports. This suggests 
that empty hulls are entering the one harbor and leaving the 
other. Comparatively, for Hampton Roads this is true not only 
in terms of tonnages, but also in terms of dollar value; per­
haps the long-range stability of this trade is subject to 
2doubt. 
Finally, similar import-export comparisons for Baltimore, 
Boston, and Philadelphia show that in terms of both dollars 
and tons, all are heaVily favored by imports in excess of ex­
ports, more like New York than Hampton Roads. But in the 
cases of these ports, the lack of balance is more extreme for 
lThe Port Of Hampton Road£ Annual, l.3tU 
Hampton "Roads-l\rlaritiIT1El Association, 1966), po. 
(data only). 
(Norfolk: 
13-10. 
2 Ibid ., pp. 13-23 (data). 
10
 
Boston in both tonnage and values, comparable to New York 
for Baltimore in tonnage and value and for Philadelphia in 
tonnage, and dissimilar to New York for Philadelphia in 
values, in that the latter indicates a two-to-one ratio be­
tween values of imports and exports with a six-to-one ratio 
in tonnage. All three of these leading Atlantic ports lag 
both New York and Hampton Roads considerably in tonnage, but 
1 
only Boston lags Hampton Roads in cummulative trade values. 
What has been concluded by the above statistical 
review? It is safe to concede that, in general, Hampton 
Roads has not become the greatest of ports with this "great­
est of harbors." New York exceeds Hampton Roads foreign 
trade significantly in terms of tonnage and tremendously in 
terms of values. Hampton Roads greatly leads Philadelphia, 
Baltimore, and Boston in tonnage, but both Philadelphia and 
Baltimore are slightly ahead in dollar volume of foreign 
trade. Excluding coal from these comparisons, tonnage 
through Hampton Roads, as well, is overwhelmed by these two 
ports. Based on these facts, it is justifiable to conclude 
that as a general seaport, Hampton Roads has failed to find 
its Il r ightful" place in world commerce; Hampton Roads' trade 
is based too extremely on the export of one commodity and, 
therefore, is too unbalanced to declare an unqualified 
lIbido 
second-to-New York standing. 
11 
1 
Having summarized that (1) Hampton Roads contains ons 
of the greatest natural harbors in the world and, therefore, 
on the Atlantic Coast, and (2) Hampton Roads does not comprise 
the number one seaport on the Atlantic Coast, nor necessarily 
the second, why has this port failed to grow to the enviable 
position held by the Port of New York? Many of the major 
causes follow: 
1. Complete destruction by fire of Norfolk, the original 
port	 city, in 1776 (Revolution), and the subsequent 
2delay	 of reconstruction.
2.	 The blocking of the West Indian trade to the United 
States by Great Britain, combined with the costly 
repercussions by the U. S. (1815 Embargo Act through 
1830's). Hampton Roads had grown to rely heavily 
upon this trade at the time and had established no 
great trans-Atlantic trade. 
3.	 The lack of capital to support recovery from the 
economic sanctions arising from the West Indian and 
European trade failures. Without capital, foreign 
purchases could not be made and sponsored during 
transit (first half of the nineteenth century). 
lThis is not to say the present or future contributions 
of Hampton Roads are to be underestimated; both playa tremen­
dous role in foreign commerce. 
2Thomas J. Wertenbaker, Norfolk: 
(necond edition by Marvin W. Schlegel. 
University Press, 1962), p. 73. 
!! Ib . dL_~.,3Ibid., pp. It+7-H~B	 p. 1~;6. 
12 
4.	 The failure of immigration to find a place in the 
slave-labor market of Virginia forced shippers to 
sail for Northern manufacturing centers in order 
to carry their share or the immigrant traffic, 
considered to be the "frosting" on the profit for 
the Atlantic crossings (1820-30's). 1 
5.	 The ttFal1 Line Blockade" of development of railroads 
to Hampton Roads by inland-oriented politicians 
(through 1860) and the lack of comprehensive plans 
for developing Virginia's transportation, particu­
larly plans that would include exploitation of 
2
natural seaports. 
6.	 The great yellow fever epidemic of 1855, which wiped 
out one third of the population on Hampton Roads' 
southern shores. 3 
7.	 The Civil War, during and after which the Hampton 
Roads cities were permitted to deteriorate drastic­
ally under northern occupation and post-war 
recovery. I+. 
This paper discusses only one of these factors: The 
Fall Line Blockade. It is admitted that other factors, 
lIbid., pp. 156-157. 2 Ibid ., pp. 166-187. 
3R• W. Burton, Hi~~~~ of Norfolk, Virginia (Norfolk: 
Virginian Press, 1877), p. 23. 
J+-~lert8nbaker, Ope cit., p. 247. 
13
 
beyond those listed, influenced the relative growth of 
Virginia's foreign water-borne trade; this is a partial list. 
It could also be verified that of those deterents listed, 
others were of greater influence than the Blockade. However, 
because of the timeliness of the subject relative to a current 
question before the state government, a question which might 
suggest that a disappointing phase of Virginia history is 
soon to be repeated, Chapter II deals with the historical 
significance of the IfBlockadell concept and the validity of 
its existence. This review investigates the question: Was 
the Fall Line Blockade a case of one segment of the state 
seeking to accomplish local aims at the long-range expense 
of progress for the entire state by neglect of Hampton Roads, 
the natural seaport? 
The ~Jrrent subject, to be related in Chapter III, is 
that involving the dredging of the James River channel to 
deepen it from 2S feet to 3S feet between Hampton Roads and 
Richmond. Chapter III presents the James River Project, 
arguments for and against it, and a summary of the ramifica­
tions the proposal presents. A questionnaire survey (see 
Appendix for sample) was employed to supplement the study of 
coverage by periodicals. The survey, mentioning the Fall 
Line Blockade, was designed to plant additional food for 
thought in the minds of those solicited for the stimulation 
of answers to relative questions. 
Chapter IV smnrnarizBs by presenting the parallelisms 
between the two questions. It is the purpose here to deter­
14 
mine the extent to which a correlation prevails between the 
Fall Line Blockade of the nineteenth century and the pro­
posed $40 million project to deepen the James for develop­
ment along its banks and for the exploitation of Richmond as 
a major Atlantic seaport. This final chapter, then, asks 
for today this question: Is the proposed James River Project 
a case of one segment of the state seeking to accomplish 
local aims at the long-range expense of progress for the 
entire state by neglect of Hampton Roads, the natural seaport? 
CHAPTER II 
THE RELEVANCE OF 'lliE FALL LINE BLOCKADE 
Thomas J. Wertenbaker presented a vivid description 
of the Fall Line Blockade concept in his comprehensive 
historical book, Norfolk: Historic Southern Port. Quoting 
an early Norfolk newspaper, he supported the urgency of the 
sub ject of this study: 'lWi thout foreign commerce Norfolk 
must dwindle to a village, and Virginia sink to the lowest 
. U· I 183· ssca1e ln th. enlon • .• ttl n t h e 0' HamptonoadsR did 
not rely to great extent upon a military populace, as today, 
but the importance of maintaining and improving the foreign 
trade role was no less then than it is today. 
The decade of the 1830's perhaps was the most signifi­
cant to the long-range outcome of Virginia's progress in 
commerce. \"fhile many efforts prior to that time were unfor­
tuna te, all 1.'Ii'ere basically justified because of the lack of 
alternatives. With the 1830 was seen the beginning of
'
s 
the railroad in America. Had Virginia recognized the oppor­
tunity to realize the rutility of water routes across the 
mountains, choosing rail transportation as a solution, the 
.-.. 
/' 
position of the State as first in wealth and population in 1800­
1Vlertenbaker, 2Q. oit., p. 151,,", citing the Norfolk 
Fj~~~on, Harch 13, 1834. 
2Dorothy M. Torpey, Hallowed Herit~: The Life of 
Virrtinia (Richmond: t>Jbittet and Shepperson, 1961', p. 9Ci:" 
___"~" -• .,l. _ 
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may not have been lost to more progressive states. Left with­
out a comprehensive "plan"--state or national, fI . . • dia­
ltracted with petty jealousies and local interest • • ., n aJrld 
determined to hang on to a dream embellished in the early 
successes of the Erie Canal in New York, liThe proud Old 
Dominion • • • saw one state after another pass her in all 
1l 2that makes for influence and pm..rer. 
I. THE GEOGRAPHIC PROBLEM 
The geography of Virginia was one of the most diversi­
fied in the country. Much of early transportation was 
influenced by five major topographical regions: (1) The 
South Atlantic Coastal Plain--Tidewater, ranging from sea 
level to less than 400 feet in elevation; (2) The Piedmont 
Plateau--300 to Sao feet elevation in the east to 800 to 1200 
feet in the west; (3) The Blue Ridge and Valleys, rising to 
peaks the highest of which is 5719 feet; (4) The Appalachian 
Ridge and Valleys, including numerous high, narrow ridges and 
valleys, most notably the Shenandoah Valley; and (5) The 
3AppalachIan Plateau, consisting primarily of rugged terrain. 
The Fall Line, dividing the Piedmont and the Tidewater, 
was created by the risIng of the rock layers of the Piedmont 
lWertenbaker, QE. ci!., p. 186. 
2 Ibid ., pp. 186, 1660 
3Torpey, EE. cit., pp. ll-l!j-; and F'rancis Butler Simkins, 
Spot SlA100d Hunni cut t,- and Sidman P. Poole, Vi:r:.&~T!L~: Hi s!.(2,~~, 
Government, Geo~raphy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 19S7)-------"'-~-~._-- _._-~:.Q_-, 
Pp. ll~-16. 
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above the level of Tidewater. The result was the formation 
by the rivers of falls and/or rapids, such as above Alexandria 
on the Potomac, at Fredricksburg on the Rappahannock, at 
Richmond on the James, and at Petersburg on the Appomattox. 
The Fall Line, the head of navigation on these rivers, pre­
sented a natural site for founding the Fall Line towns as 
shown in Figure 2. Vessels could go no further, either up or 
down stream, and had to unload cargoes 1there. 
Economic penetration of the interior of the continent 
had been restricted to fur trade in early America, but the 
supporting transportation system in this commerce would not 
move bulk commodities needed for development. The first 
primary barrier to the west was the Appalachian Mountains, 
extending 1200 miles from the northern boundary of the country 
;> 
through the state of Virginia deep into the South.- The 
mountain system was too long to be circumvented; it had to 
be pierced. Even the potential routes included hundreds of 
miles of difficult country that had to be made naVigable. 
itA canal half-way through the Appalachians ••• t.,rould be 
inadequa.te lt ; the required investments would be immense for 
an economy in a primitive state of development with scarce 
3capital resources. 
18 i mkins, Hunn i cut t , and Po 0 Ie, QE • cit., p p. 13 -14 • 
?Vir~inia included the present state of West Virginia 
until 1861,~when a split over secession took place. 
3John B. Lansing, Tran~~ortatign and EC~~9mic POli£y 
(New York: The Pree Press, 19651; pp. 91-93; and Caroline ~. 
MacGi 11, His tor;y of Transporta t1 on in the Unt tgd States bt) fore 
1860 (F'orge Village, Mass.: The Nurray Printing Company, n.d. ~ 
r'eprintedby Petor Smith, 19~~e), pp. 262-263. 
~ '" 
FALL LTIJE CITIES 
~ Alexandria (Potomac River) A. Chesapea..1{e Bay 
2. Fredricksburg (Eapp~~&~~ock River) B. Hampton Roads 
3. Rich~ond (J~~es River) ---Principal Fall Line 
4. Petersburg (Appomatox River) Rivers 
{J 
CD 
() 
o 
.. 
North Carolina 
.. 
I-' 
coFigure 2. Topographical Regions, Fall Line Rivers, and Fall Line Cities 
of Virginia (Source: Hallowed Heritage: ~~ £f Virginia) 
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II. THE NATIONAL PLAN REJECTED 
Many concepts, including "internal improvements, tt 
"States' rights," and "sectionalism," played major roles 
in the development of transportation. Perhaps the most 
influential of these were the ramifications of efforts for 
the development of a If national plan lt for transportation, 
federally supported and/or federally directed toward national 
goals. It was widely understood that total economic benefit 
derived from a transportation facility would exceed the pri­
vate revenue from tolls and charges, and a spirit of "public 
good ll carried much of the weight in the promotion of internal 
. 1lmprovements. The most common explanation for the lack or 
2 progress in internal improvements was the lack of money. 
In the early nineteenth century a basic political question 
was that of the extent to which the national government, 
rather than the state of local governments, should become 
involved in developmental and exploitative efforts. A 
national approach received serious consideration o 
The Senate of the United States in 1807 directed 
Albert Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury, to prepare a 
eral plan of road, canal, and rail improvements. Gallatin's 
comprehensive report on roads and canals was submitted in 
1808. It remarkably summarized the first artificial water­
lIbid., Lansing, pp. 93-95. 
2Carter Goodrich, Government Promotion of American Canals 
ane'! RaLlrC?~ds, lElOO-1890 1New York: Columbia -University P1~ess. --­
19601; p. 23. 
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ways of the future intercoastal waterways system (in part), 
as well as proposing routes for penetration of the Appalachian 
Mountain barrier. The latter portion proposed exploitation 
of the route up the Hudson to Lake Champlain, down the Mohawk 
to Lakes Ontario and Erie, and development of four pairs of 
rivers, also crossing the Appalachians: The Allegheny and the 
Juniata or Susquehanna, the Monongahela and Potomac, the 
Tennessee and the Savannah or Santee, and the Kanawha and 
1James. The latter of these cut an east-west route through 
Virginia and consisted of the prime target of Wertenbaker's 
Fall Line Blockade concept, as will be seen. 
Though the federal government did take important steps 
to assist transportation, particularly in the second half of 
the nineteenth century, the idea of a comprehensive national 
2plan was never very popular and was abandoned. Nevertheless, 
the prime goal in this area prior to mid-century was the 
assault of the Appalachian Barrier, and amazing resemblances 
to the proposals of Gallatin were pursued. 
The Itbattle" over the national concept was important, 
for it reflected the deepest roots of the failures in develop­
ment of transportation in Virginia. Nationalism in internal 
~ 
improvements was strongly advocated by the West.~ George 
lLansing, ££. cit., pp. 92-93. 
;> 
~ Ibid. 
~ ~Now West Virginia 
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Washington made "tours of inspection" in 1770, 1772, and 1774 
to supply himself with facts to show the costs, feasibility, 
and desirability of a James-KanaWha connection. In 1775 an 
act was passed in the Virginia legislature to provide for the 
1improvement of both the James and the Potomac rivers. As 
reported in Ambler's Sectionalism in Virginia from 1776 to 
1861, a united vote of the West against the East in the 
Assembly of 1814-1815 adopted a vast scheme of internal im­
provements, calling for expediency in securing federal 
appropriations to aid in construction. The representative 
2from Norfolk joined the West in this attempt. Again in 1818 
and 1820 the West sought federal internal improvements through 
further appropriations to the Cumberland Road. Kanawhans 
proposed to ammend these acts to include authorization of the 
federal government to subscribe two-fifths of the stock of 
any company incorporated to secure the James-KanaWha communi­
1 
cation.~ 
However, it became apparent that the Chesapeake and 
Ohio Canal would benefit the West, but not the East and the 
lower Fall Line towns. Sectional jealousies increased as the 
C. and O. Ganal received a federal appropriation, but not the 
.Tames-Kanawha project. Sentiment grew and a convention ItJas 
IMacGill, 2£. cit., pp. 269-270 
") P '" l' in Virp;iniaLCharlas Henry Ambler,h.D., ~ectlona_ls~ 
T 1 q';Ii)frQ~ 1776 to 1861 (New York: Russell and Russell, 1. nc ., __ /04 , 
pp. 96-99. 
31bid ., PPo 104,-106. 
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held in Charlottesville to revive interest in the struggling 
James-Kanawha Canal, making it a rival scheme to that of the 
Ifederal government on the Potomac. 
The arguments against nationalism in these projects 
grew, the chief one evolving around States' rights princi­
pIes. They argued that the Constitution gave the federal 
government no power to use federal funds to build roads and 
canals between the states. They warned that if the federal 
government used funds for these purposes, its next step would 
be to infringe on other private affairs of Virginians o Fur­
ther, they stated that federal support of canal and road 
building would help Virginia little and alleged that routes 
easier than that through Virginia would be selected. 
Virginians would not want to be taxed for internal improve­
2 
ments in other states. 
The first half of the nineteenth century found the 
strict constructionists successful for the most part. Of the 
four intercoastal waterway recommendations of Gallatin, the 
federal government partially supported two. But on the cru­
ctal problem of the Appalachian Barrier, federal assistance 
was limited to the National Road and an early appropriation 
to the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company. The principal 
achi.evements of internal improvements had been the work not 
of the national government toward national goals, but of 
1 Iblc]. , pp. 125-126. 
')
cSimkins, Hunnicutt, and Poole, 2.2.. cit., pp. 36:>-366. 
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what John Quincy Adams called ttState legislature and private 
1 
adventure. 1t 
III. EARLY EFFORTS IN TRANSPORTATION--THE CANALS 
Virginia rejected a national approach to solving her 
transportation needs; the challenge that lay ahead was obvious. 
With this in view Virginia surely would have embarked on a 
State-directed program for internal improvements. However, 
the State did not and, as will be described in the pages that 
follow, although some steps were initiated in this direction, 
truly tmified or comprehensive results were never realized 
prior to the outbreak of the Civil War. Had such a plan been 
organized on a broadminded basis, development of Hampton 
Roads as the Vire;inj.a port would have come to the fore as a 
2
ma.1 or fae tor in th is scheme. Furt her, such plan vTOuld have 
presented an opportunity to realize the importance of pro­
viding trunk routes first, vdthout excessive time and expendi­
turs on feeder lines to appease local interests enroute and 
without undesirable emphasis based purely on political jea1­
ousies and differences. 
The influence of conservatism and tradition reduced 
the likelihood of changing concepts as to modes of navigation. 
Communication between East and West by means of canals was 
IGoodrich, ~. ciL, pp. 1614-165. 
? Ope 't p. 175.-Wertenbaker, Cl·., 
24
 
first suggested by Washington in 1753; in the late 1700's he 
studied and recommended that the Appalachians must be con­
quered by a canal. Under his influence the James River 
Company was incorporated in 1785 to provide a canal around 
the falls above Richmond and to improve navigation of the 
1 
River above the falls. 1t0f course, this business venture 
would take many years to complete, but it would be well worth 
2 
the effort in trade." 
The first section of the James River Canal was completed 
around the falls seven miles above Richmond by 1795. By 1805 
the main bed of the James River was made navigable 156 miles 
to Lynchburg. In 1826 improvements to the Kanawha River were 
nearly completed, and a road connecting the two rivers was 
3provided. In thirty years only a limited degree of success 
was realized by the James River Company, however, for James 
transportation was limited to light, flat-bottomed barges and 
handling of traffic between modes of transportation was exces­
sive. 
Many famous men of the colonial period, including 
'lIJashtngton who surveyed the Dismal Swamp, became involved in 
activities concerning the huge swampland southwest of Norfolk. 
An early dream was the establi shment of a ~'Il'ater transportation 
lAmbler, ~. cit., pp. 47-48 0 
2 .Tul ia Cuthbert Pollard, Hichmond 's 5tory (Richmond: 
Hichrnond Fubllc Schools, 1954), p. 63. 
5Simkins, Hunnicutt, and Poole, S2E • .cit., p. 3Ll-7. 
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system between the rich lands of North Carolina and the grow­
ing ports of Norfolk and Portsmouth. As best determinable, 
actual work by the Dismal Swamp Canal Company began in 1793, 
having been chartered in 1787 by Virginia and in 1790 by North 
Carolina. The work was slow and the project filled with 
errors, but a shallow canal was completed connecting Hampton 
Roads to Albemarle Sound in 1805. However, the waterway was 
too shallow to be of great value and by 1814 became little 
more than a drainage ditch. Ignored until 1826, the Dismal 
Swamp Canal was deepened and widened and by 1829 was a useful 
1 
route for carrying North Carolina trade to Hampton Roads. 
Though the Dismal Swamp Canal played heavily in saving early 
Hampton Roads from complete economic isolation, it was not a 
Virginia route, but an artery for the flow of fa~ products 
from another state. Virginia was not yet ready to include 
the ports of Hampton Roads in plans for development of com­
merce. 
As an epilogue to complete this discussion on Virginia 
Canals, the Dismal Swamp Canal became nearly inactive in 18S9 
following its two most prosperous decades. This was the 
result of the opening of the Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal 
in that year; the new canal provided a deeper, wider, sea-
level connection between the Eastern Branch of the Elizabeth 
River and North Carolina's Albemarle Sound. This was an 
important line of communication for Hampton Roads, for it 
lIrJid., p. 31J9; and Hubert J. l)nvis, The Great Disnjal 
~:h'Jarnp (Hichmond: Cavalier Press, 1962), po. !d-Ld~, 49,b3-b~" 
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opened navigation by larger vessels from northeastern North 
Carolina at more favorable toll rates than had the Dismal 
Swamp Canal. Though immediate results were disrupted by the 
Civil War, considerable postwar cotton trade developed, 
strengthening Norfolk's position as the primary port for 
northeast Carolina. l 
IV. SURVEYS, REPORTS, AND THE BOARD
 
OF PUBLIC WORKS--STILL NO PLAN
 
The early efforts appeared to be based strongly on the 
national recommendations provided by Gallatin. In actuality 
they were not, for they were conceived and begun prior to his 
report (1808) and were based on (1) the advice of favorite 
sons, (2) local political interests and legislative logroll­
ing, and, (J) for the mos t part, local f inane ial subseri pt ions. 
However, efforts opening the door to some degree of organiza­
tion by the State tegan to evolve in 1812. 
A Virginia legislative committee, headed by Chief 
,Justice John T'-1arshall, in 1812 examined the James-Kanawha 
ronte, concluding that no unusual difficulties were expected 
2in the 425-mile route. However, the committee warned that 
NtHJ York's proposed t-Jork (Erie Canal) would draw from the 
lIbido (Davis), pp. 71, 85; and \'Jertenbaker, QQ. cit .• 
pp. If35-I13'6: 
2This route included a twenty-eight-mile turnpike over 
tho mou.ntains. 
27
 
western trade unless I~ • • • Virginia seized its opportunity 
to open the much shorter route by the James or Potomac.",l 
The second of these early reports came in 1815 from 
the Assembly's Committee on Roads and Navigation under chair­
man Charles F. Mercer, later president of the Chesapeake and 
Ohio Canal Company (Potomac route). This committee was con-
corned with the extension and systemization of the internal 
improvement movement. This committee reported two areas of 
difficulty which had to be met, namely, blunders in the 
operation of the particular projects and mistakes or favorlt­
ism in the choice of projects to be undertaken. They recom­
mended establishment of a board to provide the General 
Assembly with facts relevant to each application and, secondly, 
the establishment of a fund--rather than special appropria­
tions--to support internal improvement projects. The result 
was the establishment in the Act of 1816 of the Fund for 
Internal Improvements and the Board of Public Works, which 
? 
wou Id manage the Fund. L~ 
The Fund consisted of revenues from stock held by the 
state in canals, turnpikes, banks, etc. The Board was author­
ized to subscribe in the name of the Commonwealth to such 
public works as the legislature would direct, provided three-
fifths of the stock in a particular project had been assumed 
IGoodrich, £2. cit., pp. 87-88.
 
2Ibi~., pp. 88-92.
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1 
by private parties. 
Here was an excellent opportunity for the State to 
launch an overall program, choosing goals for the common good 
and expediting these goals, or projects, to early realization. 
Nevertheless, no such program or control was forthcoming. 
liThe petty scale of much of private enterprise may be illus­
trated by the • • • advantages claimed for the Virginia 
system of state aid • • • [by) ••• its Board of Public 
n 2Horks • •• In the administration of public works, both 
the legislature and the Board continued to operate under the 
general policies laid down by the 1816 committee--reliance on 
individual initiative and limitation of State control. Even 
after the State increased its permissible stock in individual 
companies to three-fifths, it deliberately held the State's 
vote to a minority. State self-restraint in the exercise of 
power and great reluctance to enter into the administration 
of the various companies left the State and the Board in the 
position of little more than disinterested investors, volun­
teering technical assistance only with no control and no 
pursuit of overall objectives. Late in the pre-Civil War era, 
for example, the State was building a railroad (the Covington 
and Ohio) via the same route teing pursued by the James River 
and Kanawha Canal Company.3 But II ••• the James River and 
IH. S. Tanner, A Description of the Canals and Railroads 
of the Un:lted States (Ne\{ York: To R. Tanner and J. Disturnell, 
IHL+OT; p. 160. 
2Goodrich, QE. cit., p. lao 
')r11he .Jame s Ii 1ver Company had been reorgan i zed and inc orpor­
ated hy the above name in It)32. 
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Kanawha Canal Company claimed a prior right to construct a 
ral"'_road or a cana1 over th e rout e designated. "1 The.State 
certainly could have stopped sponsorship of one course or the 
other, had it chosen to intervene. The Board, a potentially 
valuable tool, did little to liberalize the State's approach 
to transportation; it was then concerned with little more 
than losing the trade of Richmond to Philadelphia and Balti­
more, apparently not aware of the long-range effects on the 
2State as a whole. In fact, both of these duplicating efforts 
in their race to pierce the Appalachian Barrier failed. The 
West remained isolated from central and eastern Virginia 
through 1861, for the canal ran only to Buchanan, about forty 
miles west of Lynchburg, and the paralleling railroad, as 
well, terminated at the foot of the Alleghenies. This surely 
resembled in no way any concept of a comprehensive plan with 
State control! To make matters worse, in the late 1850's 
Virginia's credit had declined recause of large appropriations 
to internal improvement companies. This made II ••• it im­
3possible to prosecute 'ltlork on a central line of improvements."
The Norfolk Argus summarized this lack of an improve­
ment plan by reporting: 
Near $30,000,000 have been lavished on the inland 
cities, t-Jith no great and general result" •• our 
1Goodrich, ~. cit., p. 97~ 
'?(-Ambler, 212.. cit., p. 104.
 
JAmb1er, Ibl~., p. 313.
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efforts were misdirected and our means so misapplied 
that we were among the last to accomplish any • • • 
practical result. 1 
V. PERSISTING EFFORTS FOR CANAL DEVELOPMENT 
The decade of the 1830's with the introduction of 
steam railways presented renewed opportunity in Virginia for 
piercing the Appalachian Barrier, as well as for re-assessing 
her overall transportation development. However, according 
to most writers on the subject, in general, Virginia failed 
at this time to grasp its chance. 
Why was the James-Kanawha Rivers project, nearly 
abandoned for sundry reasons at various times since her incep­
tion in 1785, revived by rechartering in 1832 into the James 
River and Kanawha Canal Company (hereafter, J. R. K. C. Co.)? 
Baltimore, the first to significantly respond to the new 
challenge, had laid the cornerstone to the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railway as early as 1829, giving that city a long head 
::' 
start over the Hampton Roads rival ports.- To add further to 
the questions surrounding the dilemma of channeling future 
produce of Virginia to Virginia ports, the legislature incorp­
orated railroads connecting with the B & 0, permitting Balti­
more to assume the position of seaport for much of Virginia. 
One reason for the line of improvements not yet empha­
1Hertenbaker, on. cit., p. 176, citing Norfolk Argus, ~ -9~-,-1858.lV1a rc h !Lt-, 1856, and July 
2 Ibid., p. 166. 3Ibid ., p. 177; and Ambler, QP. gil.,
p.125. 
3 
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sized was that Virginia IS If, ••• legislators yet believed 
it possible to make Richmond a commercial rival of Baltimore, 
l 
Philadelphia, and New York. The opening of trade to Balti­
more was hardly consistent with this It goal lt ~ Beyond the 
traditional, political, and local aspects, one of the greatest 
influences upon canal building long into the age of railroads 
was the tremendous success of New York with the Erie Canal. 
The economic wisdom of the Erie Canal, extending 363 miles 
across New York, and its feeder canals was above question, for 
it paid for itself and made a major contribution to the develop­
ment of New York State, New York City, and the nation, as well. 
The success was proclaimed by the historian of the canal-open­
ing celebration in 1826 as follows: IIThey have built the 
longest canal in the world in the least time, with the least 
experience, for the least money, and to the greatest public 
benefi t. ,,2 The dreams inspired by the stories from Nev.! York 
had considerable effect on the choice to reinstate work on 
the James-Kanawha connection in 1832. The new company was 
supplied with funds from the State of Virginia and the cities 
3
of Richmond and Lynchburg. 
Nevertheless, railroads became a greater factor in 
transportation dally. While the West saw it as the only prac­
ti cal solution to its problems in 1831, the East clung to the 
'")1l.!?i.2., p. 175. cGoodrich, £E. cit., p. 53. 
3Lansing, .2.£. cit., p. 101; vJertenbaker, Q12. cite, 
p. 166; Goodrich, QE. cit., pp. 52-53; and Simkins, Hunnicutt, 
and Poole, 2.£. ciL, p. 347. 
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canal. The Richmond press applied arguments used by the 
Chesapeake and Ohio Canal (which it opposed on general 
lprinciples) to promote the James River and Kanawha Canal. 
One enlightening aspect was that the legislature, while 
incorporating the J. R. K. C. Coo to extend the canal to 
Lynchburg and to make the Kanawha navigable, did choose to 
recommend connection of the two waterways by a railroad. 
Though it may have been too much to expect the legislature 
to see at this early date the possibilities of railroad trans­
portation, to accept the wisdom of abandoning George Washington's 
dreams of a canal to the Ohio, and to ignore the fact that the 
Erie Canal had made New York so wealthy and powerful, they did 
not stop to consider that profits would be eaten up by trans­
shipments from the Kanawha to the railway, to the James canal, 
?
and finally to tho lO....ler James. - ltThey did not dream that 
eventually railways would prove so efficient that even the 
lt3great Erie Canal could not compete with them. Even when the 
errors became apparent, they did not choose to abandon the 
4past canal investment for aggressi~ railroad development.
According to H. S. Tanner's 1840 report on Virginia: 
The most important work now in progress in Virginia is 
the James and Kanal.tlha river improvement ..• As soon [as] 
it shall be completed i~ may be expected to pour into the 
canal an immense trade.~ 
IAmbler, 2£. cit., p. 179. 
2The falls could not be bypassed by the large craft then 
using the James Canal. 
JV{E~rtenbaker, Qp. ciL, p. 1n~. )IIbid. 
5Tannl'lr, 9.£. ,=Jt., pp. 160-161. 
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Aga in in the 181-l-4-18L-I-5 As sembly there was an attempt· by the 
Whigs to connect the James and Kanawha with a continuous 
canal. The scheme found some favor, but the Senate approved 
the appropriation only on the basis that the canal be con-
I 
structed no further than Buchanan. In 1851 the James River 
Canal did reach Buchanan, 196 miles from Richmond, but there 
the canal stopped, leaving "the people ••• disappointed 
that they had been unable to carry out Washington's dream of 
a water connection •.• [to] ••• the region beyond the 
2 
mountains." 
That this line might be concluded, the 1859-1860 
Assembly revived interest in the canal to the Ohio by author­
iZing another $2.5 million loan for the Company,3 and as late 
as 1871 Congress was approached for a $50 million grant with 
the following argument: II It has been supposed by some that 
the day of canals is past. Facts do not sustain this view 
Illl The funds from the national government were not 
approved. Unforttmately, the census of 1880 treated the 
r: 
canal as one of the abandoned waterways,~ nearly negating 
1A } 1
- m.) ar, QE. cit., pp. 241-242. 
?
-:simkins, Hunnicutt, and Poole, £E. cit., p. I.347 • 
., 
JAmbler, ~. cit., p. 317. 
L1rJfacGill, SD2.. cit., p. 271, oitin,,:,; Report of Chief o~ 
E~gino~Ts, February 9, 1871, in House Doc'cilllent No. 110, 41st. 
Congress, Third Sessa 
~ . ~)HacGi 11, Qj2. c i_b, p. 271. 
34 
almost one century and $10.5 million of effort in pursuit 
of a canal through the Appalachian Barrier. 1 
F
All this relative to the James River and Kanawha Canal 
served to verify contentions that Virginians (1) strenously 
failed to tear themselves from the bonds of tradition and 
ultraconservatism established so early by George Washington, 
and later associated with Virginians Chief Justice ~~rshall 
and Colonel Breckenridge; (2) sought goals with very local­
ized interests in view; (3) failed at their opportunity to 
provide a strong central Board of Public Works; and (4) 
failed to recognize the infeasibility of crossing mOlmtains 
by canals when a change to a practical, long-range method 
presented itself with the advent of the railroad. These 
aspects served to verify Wertenbaker's prime target of argu­
mentation for the failure of Virginia to re-cstablish and 
build its very ear 1y lead in trade; but those Virginia ven­
tures in railroads that did take place best exemplified his 
1 al1 Line Blockade allegations relative to the retarding of 
Hampton Roads' development. 
VI" RAILROADS FOR THE FALL LINE--BUT
 
NOT .b'OR HAMPTON ROADS
 
Obviously, V1rginians could not entirely ignore rail­
road development, as may have been implied in the previous 
lIbid., pp. 273~ h59. 
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discussion. However, it was extremely apparent that full 
advantage of that mode of transportation first was oVer­
shadowed by the canal approach to conquering the Barrier 
and, secondly, was overlooked in meeting the import-export 
development of her "natural harbor lf at Hampton Roads. A 
chronology of railroad sponsorship and promotion by the 
state legislature reflected the latter aspect. 
'ii j'~ 
rt~The movement of produce to the coast from inland ;.r~.'.··.jl .....producers had to be broken at the nearest point where 
"
".,.,·~kJ 
freight could be transferred from wagon to boat. This was 
the case before the railroad, and the Fall Line cities 
1flourished as a result. In 1830 the first locomotive built 
in the United States was placed into operation on the 
Charleston and Hamburg in South Carolina. In 1831 horse 
drawn coal cars operated on twelve miles of tracks between 
the mines in Chesterfield County and Richmond, doing a 
thriVing business in this manner until 1850. The Petersburg 
Railroad Company, chartered in 1830, connected with Weldon, 
North Carolina, on the Roanoke River in 1833 to become the 
first steam powered railroad in Vlrgln• • i a. 2 News 0 f t'ne 
plr-ms for this project by Petersburg reached Norfolk in 
1929 and stirred Norfolk to action. lilt is absurd for 
Potorsburg to aspire to be a great seaport ••• Why, most 
11' . d 
.. bl.,p. 
?Ibld., p. 310; 'Tanner, Q£. cit., p. 162; and Pollard, 
gP.. ci 1:. ,-p. 111 0 
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1 
of her people never saw a ship," stated a Norfolk news­
paper. 
As a result, the Portsmouth-Weldon line was projected 
to run seventy-six miles to Weldon in hopes of retaining the 
Hampton Roads trade level with North Carolina. The people 
of Norfolk subscribed $100,000 in stock and Portsmouth took 
$50,000, but a request for the additional aid needed from 
the State was blocked in the Senate by a fourteen to four­
teen tie vote, blamed by the Norfolk Herald on the Petersburg 
interests aligned with the deep-rooted jealousy of the 
2Richmond group. 
Though disappointment ensued as a result of blunders 
in construction, wasted investment in shops for building 
rolling stock (determined to be infeasible), and a failure 
to draw the trade back from Petersburg, the construction of 
a railway from Weldon to Willmington, North Carolina, in 
1841 brought new hope. However, the connection between the 
Portsmouth line and the itlilmington line had required con­
struction of a bridge across the Roanoke; the financial 
strain was too great and the creditors sold their claims to 
Captain Francis E. Rives, a representative of the Petersburg 
line. His activities and a long, losing, legal battle for 
the Portsmouth road ended in the failure of Norfolk's first 
lWertenbaker, 2£. cit., p. 167, citing tho Norfolk 
r8J..:~1, February 27, 1833. 
2 11 . 1~..£:1:.9.., p. 
3'7 
1
effort to benefit by means of railroad development. 
The preceding were only the first of Virginia's early 
railroad projects; in fact, these hardly represented Virginia 
routes, but exploitation of the resources of other states by 
individual Virginia cities, as had been the case with the 
canals. The Baltimore and Ohio line, already mentioned, 
tapped northern Virginia's resources by a connection with 
Winchester, completed in 1836. This marked the end to depri­
vation of the northv-lest part of Virginia from a connection 
with the outside world, for it opened Virginia territory to 
further exploitation by the very aggressive Baltimore rail­
2 
road interests. 
It had been only a few years before, in the 1830-1831 
legislature, that two of five railroad companies incorpor­
ated were the Staunton and Potomac and the Lynchburg and 
New River. The plan of the East was to divert the trade of 
the West from the New York and Pennsylvania routes to the 
Kanawha-River, New-River, and James-River routes. Norfolk 
had favored the plan on the assumption that the proposed 
railroad line would eventually be extended to her piers Theo 
entire scheme was killed '\...}'hen the same session rejected an 
appropriation to aid the newly incorporated companies, for 
3private capital simply was not available in the West. 
1~ hid., Pp. 168-1 73; an d I'1a c Gi 11, £E • cit., P P • 46W- 1.1 6S• 
2Ambler, Q£. cit., p. 179.
 
3;~!?ic!., PPm 100-181; and MacGill, QE. cit., p. )~~;7.
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Failure to recover from this, perhaps, made this one of the 
most crucial of moves for Virginia for it led to lack of 
success in breaking through the Barrier; this was never 
realized until well after the Civil War. An era of con­
servatism and prejudice against railroad construction within 
the State had begun, and considerable deterrence to progress 
was the re sult. 
Other railroad companies were incorporated, but most 
significant to this study was the almost unanimity of rail­
road projects connecting Fredricksburg, Richmond, and 
Petersburg (tTFall Line" Cities) with the available trade 
centers. As presented by Tanner in the 1840 report by 
1 
Virginia: 
The principle works of this description [railroads] 
in the state are the Richmond and Fredricksburg, Richmond 
and Petersburg, and the Pe~ersburg and Roanoke Rail-roads 
Lsicj ••• 1tJhen Virginia shall have completed the rail­
road between Fredricksburg and the Potomac, and corrected 
the roads at Richmond and Petersburg, she will have done 
every thing that can reasonably be expected of her • • • 
With her great western and south-western improvements 
carried o~~t ••• Virginia might again ~ake rank among 
the foremost states of the confederacy. 
These statements and the forecasts of other railroad projects 
found in Tanner's report verified several of Wertenbaker's 
allegations: First, a concentration of economic sponsorship 
and promotion of Fall Line city development with hardly token 
consideration for the Hampton Roads area; secondly, an almost 
1 T"d" 'I',m or"lnos are those of this author to emphasize the 
lIF'al1 Llne ll nature of tho staternent. Report assmll0d to be 
report of Board of Pub] ic Harks. 
") ('T'annor, £E. ~it., p. 160, 166. 
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complete ignorance of any potential to be realized from aid 
to development of Hampton Roads; and third, a firm belief 
that the State was doing all that could be expected in the 
realm of progressive railroad programs. Nevertheless, as 
stated in the previous section of this chapter and in the 
above report, as well, "The most important work now [1840J 
in progre ss • • ." was the James and Kanal..Jha River improve­
1 
ment o Virginia railroads built prior to the 
conceived during the period but not completed, 
in Table IV, re-emphasized the theme of these 
The Richmond and Ohio was incorporated 
Civil War or 
as summarized 
ideas. 
in 1846 as 
" 
another approach to crossing the mountains, and a hotly ;~.k " 
contested bill to extend the Baltimore and Ohio through 
Virginia was passed in the same year. The Canal interests, 
however, gathered enough votes to kill the state appropria­
tion bill for $4.8 million (of a needed capital of $10 mil­
lion), and the former line only reached the eastern side of 
the mountalns by 1860 0 The latter railroad was successful 
during the pre-Civil War period in making two valuable 
connections with the Ohio to Parkersburg and Wheeling, both 
(then) in Virginia, but its route laid on or within the entire 
northern border of Virginia west of Washington. It served to 
dre in northern Virginia of her resources to the 1mquest ton­
able pleasure of Baltimore, having connected in 1836 with the 
1 .IbId., p. 160. 
• • 
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RAILROADS PLANNED BY VIRGINIA BEFORE 1861>l< 
Railroad 
Petersburg and Roanoke' .\ 
I 
Winchester -Potomac 
· . . 
Portsmouth-Roanoke 
· . . 
Louisa. • • • • • • • 
· . . 
Rich., FredJburg, Potomac 
Cumulative of lines less 
than 25 miles each • • • 
Baltimore-Ohio •••••• 
South Side •••• • • til 
Virginia-Tennes s ee • . . . 
Northwestern •••. . . . 
Norfolk-Petersburg. 
Richmond-Danville 
Orange -Alexandria • • 
Manassas Gap ••• IiiI • • • 
Virginia-Central o • .. • • 
Propos ed in 1840':<* 
Staunton-Scottsville •• 
Danville - Wythe . . • •• 
Fredricksburg-Scotts.. 
Year Length
 
Completed (miles)
 
1833 
1836 
1837 
1837 
1837 
1842 
by 
1840 
1853 
1854 
1856 
1857 
1858 
80 
32 
80 
49 
61 
14 
89 
240 
(in Va.) 
122 
209 
100 
102 
1850's 147 
1850's 98 
1850's 103 
1850's 195 
n. c. 55 
n. c. 125 
n. c. 65 
Connections 
Petersburg 
Roanoke Rive r 
Winchester 
Harpers ;ferry 
Weldon, N. C. 
Portsmouth, Va. 
Richmond 
Gordonsville 
per name 
various 
Ohio River 
(Parkersburg) 
Petersburg 
Lynchburg 
Lynchburg to 
Tenn. border 
B &. 0 to 
Wheeling 
per name 
per name 
Louisa RR to 
Alexandria 
Shenandoah 
to 0 &. A RR 
Charlottesville 
to Covington 
Richmond- Yorktown •• post-war 65 
':«Government Promotion of American Canals and Railroads, 1800­
1890; History of Transportation in the Unit~d .States before 1860; Virg~nia: 
History, Government, Geography; A Descrlphon of the Canals and Rall.. 
.roads of the United States; and Norfolk: Historic Southern Port) 
**n. c. :: railroad not completed. 
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Winchester and Potomac Railroad at Harpers Ferry and sched­
uled to be connected by the Orange and Alexander Railroad 
1f 1be f or e t he v', a I' • 
In 1847 the city of Richmond voted a subscription to 
the stock of the Richmond and Danville Railroad of up to 
$200,000. The late 1840 l s saw State appropriations for a 
number of roads, indicated by the following:';J 
Blue Ridge Railroad ••.•• $300,000
Charlottesville to Staunton .•.•. 90,000
Virginia and Tennessee ••.• 1,800,000
Orange and Alexandria Road .•.•.. 1,800,000
A	 transfer of the State's 
stock in the Petersbure 
and Roanoke to the city 
of Petersburg • • • • • • . . . . • 325,000 
The Board of Public lvor'ks, Report of 1851, reported 
the emergence of a coordinated network of railroads, of which 
thE principal segments were the north-south roads between the 
Potomac fmd the North Carolina border and four routes extend­
3from it to the west. This again emphasized the omission 
of Pampton ds during the relatively later stages of Vir­
i11il; 's ()81~ly transportation development, although there at 
least Has a claim of a "coordinated program •.It Only tVJO of 
tho fouf' mentioned l.Jesterly routes, the Vir inis and Tennes­
seo (?Og miles in Virginia) and the B & 0 (supplying 1 t irnore 
_.....~~.---_.--_._--
ITJlacGiJ 1, ~. 
an() Poole. OD. cit., 
, ---"- -­J7i:~176. 
? 
cOill, QE. cit., pp. J:60-u61. 
1 
via Virginia) were completed by 1861. 
Other railroads completed within the State prior to the 
Civil War incl uded the Blue fUdge Railroad connecting the 
Louisa Road {Gordonsville) to Charlottesville, The Virginia 
and Central from Waynesboro to Covington, the Richmond and 
Danville, the Southside Railroad between Petersburg and 
Lynchburg, and the Orange and Alexandria Railroad connecting 
Gordonsville with the Potomac. Finally, after a strenuous 
appeal beginning in 1851, the Norfolk and Petersburg, connect~ 
ing the age-old rivals, opened east-west trackage across the 
2 
state in 1858. Though there was little consistency between 
references, one source reported a total of 1290 miles of 
railroad tracks in Virginia (excluding the present state of 
3West Virginia) in 1860.
_J 
VII. POST-WAR, SU~ll/illRY, AND
 
CONCLUSION OF CF~PTER II
 
How legitimate was Wertenbaker's reported Fall Line 
Blockade? His presentation in Norfolk: Historic Southern 
Port was filled with reference to editorial battles between 
the newspapers of Norfolk and Richmond and of Norfolk and 
Pe tersburg. Be cause of th is, verifi cat i on of the concept 
lIbid., p. 99; and MacGill, Q£. cit., p. 461. 
2IVJ:acGill, OPe cit., pp. 461-W.62 ; and Simkins, Hunnicutt, 
and Poole, Q£. cit., P:-3Sl 
(Simkins, et al), lac. cit. 
43 
necessarily required the opinions and reports of others, 
including considerable background on the long-range efforts 
of Virginia to develop transportation communications. 
The chronology of pre-Civil War canal and railroad 
programs leaves only the question of llwhat really was the 
purpose in ignoring Hampton Roads during this important 
period?" Surely, it was not a direct intent to hurt the 
coastal port; but a summary of basic areas of consideration 
do verify that a "blockade ll in effect, if not intent, did 
prevail. 
First, chronologically, was the influence of the num­
erous reports and recommendations of an earlier era, backed 
by such grand old Virginians as Washington, Marshall, and 
others. The tradition and ultraconservatism of these names 
overlapped Hell into the era of noanal obsolescence,lI brought 
about by the introduction of railroads. The tremendous suc­
cess of the Erie Canal had a like influence. The result was 
excessive waste through obsolescence, short-sightedness 
leading to "poor results ll 1 from many of Virginia's programs, 
and a delayed start in effective statewide transportation 
progress, such as inclusion of communication with Hampton 
Hoads. 
At a time when the faith formerly placed in waterways 
was generally being transferred t? r~i~roads as a mean~ 
of communication, the people of VlrglnlB Here engaged In 
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the construction of the James River and Kanawha Canal 
between the East and new West--the last of its kind 
to be built. l 
Secondly was the tremendous political power (blockade, 
if you will) of the Fall Line cities in controlling legisla­
tive appropriations toward jealous, localized ends, including 
2favoritism to secure this stronghold. itA legislative com­
mittee declared that Virginia harbored more local and dis­
1t3cordant interests tban any other state. The lack of 
political power in southeastern Virginia was further exempli­
fied in a recent news story reporting that Littleton Waller 
'razewell (1774-1860) was the only other southeastern Virgin­
ian to represent his state in the United States Senate prior 
to the election of William Belser Spong, Jr., to the U. S. 
Senate in 1966. 4 Perhaps it is too easy to conclude that 
this power was capable of obtaining funds for canal develop­
ment and then, in the belated attempts to update, that this 
pOvJer was also capable of hoarding funds for simultaneous 
railroad development, all the routes of which obviously were 
converged on a select group of cities while other urgent 
development only waited in amazement and futility. 
l-'-b I d 2Wertenbaker, QQ. cit., p. 186.~,:=---., p. 269. 
4Georl~e H. Tucker, "A Public r/[an VJho Longed for Privacy,\! 
Tbe Vir~inia~-Pilot (Norfolk: February 5, 1967), pp. 81-32. 
TazoweU-se-rved in the Senate from lB24 to lB32. 
c 
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It was fact that before 1858, nearly thirty years 
after the first American success with railroads, the only 
active line to or from Hampton Roads was that running to 
~~e1don, North Carolina, a safe distance from Richmond's and 
most of Petersburg's trade. The emergence of Newport News 
as a port was not to be realized until 1882 with the laying 
of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad. As a result, Newport 
Nelll1's "'Thich had been no more than a fishing village surrounded 
by farmlands, since became known as "Coal Port of the World ll 
and "Tobacco Port of America, It handling a considerable 
1 
traffic of general cargo, ore, and oils, as well. 
One Virginia historical book, compiled for public 
school use, relates: "The coming of three great railroad 
systems between 1882 and 1904 changed Norfolk from a town of 
little trade into one of the most importa~t ports in the entire 
,t 2 
country.· Had not the railroad been sought strenuously by 
Norfolk from the early 1830's, only to reach it from other 
Virginia cities no earlier than 18S8? Why was Norfolk re­
quired to vJai t for the turn of the next century to prosper 
from the nevI transporta ti on era, i-Jhi Ie the Fall Line cit ie s , 
in fact, excelled it as a port until the 1870's, when ocean 
liners had grown too large to easily ascend the James or 
IJ. Spencer Smith, Paul A. Amundsen, and Helen Delich 
Bontley, Ports of ~ Ameri9..as, His~Q!:X. m:d De~~lC:Rment (n. p. J
 
The American Association of Port AuthorItIes, inc., 1961),
 
Pp. 166-167; and Simkins, Hunnicutt, and Poole, Q.E. cit.,
 
p.41'7. 
2 Ib id. (Simkins ot all. 
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1Appomattox? 
As stated Wertenbaker, it is easy to use hindsight 
regarding 1t-Jhat s'rlOuld have been done. Had Virginians grasped 
the full significance of the possibilities and placed their 
c idence in a wise, comprehensive scheme of rail construc­
tion beginning in the decade from 1830-l6Ll-O, they "'lOuld have 
realized a higher level of economic significance. Even to 
the Bxtent of preventing disunion, perhaps they could have 
joined the vJ8stern counties (now \Nest Virginia) Hith economic 
bond s. 
Starting with Norfolk, the State's only great ocean 
port, a railway should have been built west to Peters­
burg, Richmond, Charlottesville, Staunton, Charleston, 
and the Ohio River. 'l'hore should have been no delay 
for minor undertakings, no side lines, until one central 
trunk railway had been put into operation. Then the 
north and south lines could have been added ••• 2 
The period of internal improvements was for many 
states and cities marked by glorious success, expand­
. l"h' . 1 t' ,In trad e, ow WGfL t , lDcreas ].ng POPU_B "lon. _- or 
'1' •• , • 1 I " P f' 1'- . t " t' f'vlrglnla, Bno especla_ y lor NoroK, 1· was a ~lme o~ 
wasted opportunities and bitter disappointm8nt.~ 
Intentionally or unintentionally directed, orfolk was 
Hithout question the viotim of an economic blockade--a IIFall 
Line Blockade. 1t 
, ' I C" t Y,J.. J.~_ 7S• rf, nnaH,,!', 2£. ~-:.." ",' 
'J
.) ,J hi, (i I}, r). 1. 
CHAPTER III 
PROPOSED IMPROVE}lliNT TO NAVIGATION OF THE 
LOvffiR JAMES RIVER, VIRGINIA 
I. THE PLAN OF IMPROVEMENT 
The current plan of improvement of the James River was 
presented to the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
(D. S.) by the Secretary of	 the Army on September 25, 1962. 
As	 presented, the plan recommended the modification of the 
l
eXisting James River Project to provide for a channel 
thirty-five feet deep at mean low water level and three hun­
dred feet wide, to extend from the upper end of the Richmond 
Deep Water Terminal downstream 82.3 miles to the mouth of 
the river at Newport News.	 The depth of thirty-five feet was 
established as the minimum for the potential traffic of petrol­
eum products in large tankers (up to 27,000 tons) with drafts 
up to thirty-one feet. A minimum of two feet between the 
keel and channel bottom, plus one foot for "squatlf l.-J'hen in 
motion, and one foot for loss of bouyancy while in fresh water 
wero tho accepted criteria of marine interests. Hence a depth 
of thirty-five feet was recommended. The width of three hun­
drod feet was selected as the minimum that would permit two 
::> 
largo vessals to pass each other with safety. 
ltlExisting James River Project" 1,.Jill be discussed in 
Section II of this chaptor. 
') 1) • • t" f n •LU. S. Army En~inBer _lstrIc , ~ovps 0_ ~nSlneers, 
Review HgDort on ,1r"..mes ltiver, V:i£2Jnia (Norfolk: CorDS of 
T~n[~-f ne ers~-Septornber 27~--I9t) 2 )-,-Sec:LZ3. 
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The project modification also provided for a minimum 
radius of curves of 3,000 feet in all channel bends. Though 
not entirely consistent with criteria recommended by marine 
interests, who advocate 4800 feet radius of bends, If a 
radius of 3,000 feet is considered the maximum that can be 
provided without incurring heavy costs of land acquisition, 
1dredging, and disposal rights. 1t 
Further, the improvement called for a mooring basin 
:.... 
180-220 feet wide by 2100 feet long opposite the Hopewell 
water-front. This would provide a tie-up point for vessels 
which encountered heavy fog while bound upstream. The turn­
ing basin at Deep Water Terminal was also to be widened from 
600 feet by 2700 feet to 825 feet by 2770 feet in order to 
turn and maneuver the anticipated larger ships calling at 
? 
Richmond.­
The Corps of Army Engineers report assured that avail­
able economies of design and construction would be realized 
where possible; e. g., following of existing deep water and 
3 
use of the most practical modes of dredging. 
An al terna te plan, referred to as It Plan I III, \-Jas a Iso 
studied, although not recommended because of less general 
improvement for potential traffic accompanied by only a 
sli~btly improved benefit-cost ratio. Plan II called for a 
channel thirty-two feet deep, three hundred feet wide, Bnd 
eighty-two miles in length •.l~ 
2Ibid. 
3Tbid. Lqbid., Sec. LdL. 
lIbido 
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Benefits were based on transportation charges for the 
(then) existing vessels. The primary savings anticipated in 
the report were (I) diversion of tonnages of commodities 
from rail and truck carriers to deep-draft vessels and (2) 
the incremental savings of transporting certain bulk commod­
ities in larger, deep draft vessels rather than smaller or 
partially-loaded ships. Other depths were not considered, 
apparently because Plan II reportedly gave the highest bene­
fit-cost ratio (2.4 to 1), and a diminishing ratio was assumed 
to occur at other channel depths, as concluded by the determin­
ation for the thirty-five feet channel of Plan I {2.2 to 1 
ratio).l 
Benefit-to-cost ratios were determined by diViding 
annual transportation savings creditable to each of the two 
improved channel depths by the annual carrying charges evolv­
ing from the respective improvementse Annual charges comprised 
(1) the Federal annual Charge, including interest and amorti­
zation of the Federal investment for fifty years (at 2 5/8 
per cent~ average increased cost of maintaining the proposed 
improvement, and average cost of maintaining navigation aids, 
plus (2) non-Federal annual charge, including interest ( 5 
per cent for lands, 4~ per cent for other-than-land), amorti­
zation, average non-retrievable increased cost of maintenance 
for the expanded Deep l4ater Terminal and berthing area, 
estimated net average loss of James River oyster production 
•
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(marketable and seed oysters), and average cost of maintain­
ing retaining structures. The two benefit-cost ratios were 
computed as presented in Table V, which employs total figures. l 
A major factor of the benefits to be realized was the 
predicted average annual deep-draft tonnage that could develop 
from the increased channel depths. The additional tonnages, 
as estimated in the Corps of Army Engineers report of 1962, 
were 2,825,280 tons on a channel depth of thirty-two feet 
(Plan II) and 3,192,280 tons on a channel thirty-five feet 
deep (Plan I), as presented in Table VI. 2 
Although the project improvement justification 1f.JBS 
heavily based on benefit-cost ratio criteria, the following 
was included in the introduction to the Review Report: 
The District Engineer finds that the existing 25­
foot channel ••• is entirely inadequate for the 
economical movement of bulk commodities in the for­
ei~n and coastwise trades. He finds that a channel 
35~feet deep to the Ports of Hopewell and Richmond 
would (1) permit the economical transportation of 
netro}eum and other bulk commodities now carried in 
1i ter draft vessels; (2) permit the economical 
diversion of certain commodities from rail and truck 
to lArater; and (3) place the Port of ;lichmond on a 
cornnetitive basis with other Atlantic Coast ports on 
the' ba~i~ of lee on ami cal export and import of various 
e ommod I t 1 e s.­
ConB1~ess voted approval of the project in 1962, but held up 
'1 l' t' (':" Wappropriation of funds pending flna approva oy ,ne ,-,tate. 
1,,, 'ct
,Lbl,.", Secs. 50-52.
 
"3 Il', "t' d Syl1B,bu8

' -,,-,:_,-'.,
 
11 'r ' " 'F' 1 "'­l"News item in 'Phe V Lrglnlt1n- 1.,OL, 
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TABLE V
 
COMPUTATION OF BENEFIT-COST RATIOS
 
JAMES RIVER PROJECT IMPROVEMENT
 
FOR PLANS I and II
 (Based on Predicted Fifty-year Life of the Improvement)
 
1962 Estimates
 
(Review Report 2Q James River, Virginia) 
Total Federal Investment •••••••• 
Total non-Fed Investment • • • • • • • • 
TOTAL INITIAL COST • • • • • • • • 
Total Federal Annual Carrying Charge • • 
Total non-Fed Annual Carrying Charge • • 
TOTAL ANNUAL CARRYING CHARGE • • • 
Benefits Creditable to Proposed Improvements 
(Annual Savings in Transportation Costs) $ 4,259,000 U <1 452.1000 
Benefit-Cost Ratio 2.2•(PLAN I) 
Benefit-Coot Ratio 
(PLAN II) D 
• • • • • • • • • 
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TABLE VI 
LOWER JAMES RIVER, VIRGINIA
 
PREDICTED AVERAGE ANNUAL DEEP-DRAFT TONNAGE BY COMMODITIES,
 
FOR 32- and j5-FEET CHANNELS
 
Years 1966 to 2015 A. D.
 
(Review Repor~ on James River, Virginia)
 
- = ..=-: 
Channel 32 ·fe~t - Channel j5 teet 
Commodity deep deep 
(Short tonsl (Short ton~ 
Petroleum products . • • • • • 
Iron and steel scrap ••••• 
Ammonium sulphate ••••••• 
Sulphur • • • • • • . • • • • • 
Grains, including soybeans •• 
Soda ash •• 0 • • • • • • • • 
Soda, caustic .•••••••. 
Molasses, blackstrap ••.•• 
Sugar, refined and raw ••.. 
Paper, newsprint ••••••• 
Phosphate, rock •••••••• 
Nitrate of soda •••••••• 
Potash ••••• • • • . • • • 
Other commodities (Canned 
foods,	 leaf tobacco, cot­
ton pulp, crude rubber, 
cigarettes) . • • • • . . • . 
TOTAL	 . . 
1,839,000 2,206,000 
165,000 165,000 
80,000 80,000 
61,000 61,000 
55,800 55,800 
25,000 25,000 
110,000 110,000 
50,000 50,000 
8~,000 84,000 
33,300 33,300 
27,500 27,500 
23,000 23,000 
25,000 25,000 
246,680	 246,68Q 
2,825,280 3,192,280 
Note:	 The only actual increased tonnage, according to this 
table, is in the tonnage of petroleum products; this 
fact is paramount to the justification argumentation 
as will be seen. 
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Thus, an improvement was recommended in 1962 to deepen 
the James River navigation channel from twenty-five to thirty­
five feet. The justifications for the project improvement 
were favorable benefit-cost ratios, improved navigation 
safet~ and the expected opening of Richmond and downstream 
cities to a future as inland seaports of Virginia. 
II. EVOLUTION OF EARLIER IMPROVEMENTS
 
TO THE LOWER JA1'1ES RIVER
 
The tidal section of the James River from Hampton Roads 
to Richmond has been reported as the most important inland 
waterway in the State relative to industry and trade. The 
general trade area has included Virginia, southern West 
Virginia, eastern Kentucky, northern North Carolina, ~nd 
1parts of Indiana, Ohio, and Tennessee. 
Richmond, located ninety-one miles upstream from 
Hampton Roads, further west than other ports on the north 
Atlantic Seaboard, has been credited as a manufacturing, 
retail, and Wholesale center, doing more than forty per cent 
of all wholesale business in Virginia. Transportation routes 
inland from Richmond \-Jere ah-Jays excellent, except during the 
late Civil War and Reconstruction periods. Customs receipts 
at the Port exceeded $1+ million ammally, according to a 
2 
1962 report o 
IHeview He art on James 
') 
L. T~ , 'J 
IL)lCI. , Sec. 10. 
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The port of Hopewell, located eighteen miles down­
stream from Richmond where the Appomattox merges with the 
James, has been described as an industrial city with a 1960 
population of about 18,000. Since becoming a city in 1916, 
Hopewell established reportedly the largest nitrogen plant 
in the world, as well as plants manufacturing other products, 
including fertilizers, chemicals, plastics, film, safety 
glass, explosives, and paper products. Hopewell has been 
1
served by two railroads for several years. 
The existing Federal James River Channel Project,2 
dating from 1884, included numerous modifications. In 1947 
it was completed with present Project widths and depths. 
These project specifications comprised a channel twenty-five 
feet deep and three hundred feet wide from the mouth to 
Hopewell, 69.2 miles; twenty-five feet deep and two hQndred 
feet wide betvJeen Hopet4ell and Richmond Deep 1,'J'ater Terminal, 
17.2 miles; and a channel eighteen feet deep and two hundred 
feet wide to Richmond Lock in the upper harbor (site of the 
entrance to the old James River and Kanm..,rha Canal), u.4 miles; 
a turning basin two hundred feet wide, six hundred feet long, 
and eichteen feet deep in the upper harbor; and a turning 
lIbid., Sec. 11. Significantly, of tv.renty-six terminal 
facUities on the lower lTames RivEn~, fifteen handle petroleum 
products only, tHO handle sand and gravel, tt~ro a~e tug berths, 
two arE) in disreDair and unused, two handle chenncals only, 
and only three h~ndle general cargoo 
4 
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basin 200-700 feet wide, 5200 feet longy and twenty-five feet 
deep at Deep Water Terminal. l 
Earl ier programs, originating v.JOrk on the lower James, 
included a Federal expenditure of $22,500 for dredging and 
rock removal between 1852 and l8~~y resulting from an 1836 
Federal survey. The City of Richmond contributed $21,300 
on this work y as well. The "Original Project,1t as a compre­
hensive program y was adopted by the River and Harbor Act of 
July lly 1870, and provided for a channel eighteen feet deep 
and 180 feet wide between the mouth of the river and Richmond • 
. 
By 1884 this work produced a channel 12.5 feet deep at a cost 
of $736,000. In that year the "Existing Project lt was adopted. 
To that time Ric h..TYlond had contributed $403 y058 (55 per cent) 
to the tfOriginal Project.1! Through 1947 y Richmond had met 
all terms of cooperation with the Federal Government, includ­
ing land ac qu i s i ti on y local dredging, and mai ntenance cos ts 
totalling $2,811,320. Pedera1 expenditures for nevI "Jork and 
rna intenance to taIled $14,029,048. Ric hmond also part lei pated 
voluntarily in project maintenance, spending an additional 
$123,579 between 1924 and 1939 to operate a dredge in the 
2
upper' harbor. 
The Corps of Army Engineers report stated, on the 
other hand, that 1f t he City of Hopewell has not incurred any 
3 
costs in connection Hith the Gxisting project. 1I No inmrove­
1 , \/... ODe ; +­i OvJ Repor't on ~ames 111ver, . lrglnla, _...... C~. , 
1 fi 
.1.. "-' ItCS. l~), 17-19. 
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ment had been accomplished at the Port of Hopewell, except 
1
occasional dredging by industrial interests. 
The present report (Army Engineers, 1962) to evaluate 
modifying the existing project was authorized by resolution 
of the Committee on Public Works of the United States Senate, 
adopted August 13, 1954; by resolution of the Committee on 
Public Works of the House of Representatives, adopted March 
30, 1955; and by subsequent resolutions. 2 
Though study of the project modification began soon 
after these authorizations were granted, varied questions 
have presented considerable debate on the merits of the pro­
posal i.n the form of hearings, studies, reports, alternate 
proposals, etc. Progress toward development of the modifica­
tion proposal, as a result, has been slow, as well as 
attainment of a final approval. In addition there have been 
indications that there will remain considerable room for 
further debate in the future with the result of possible 
obsolescence of the current proposal before the work o 
ITI. CHRONOLOGY OF ARGUI1'lENTATION ON THE JAIvIES RIVER
 
IMPROVEMENT PROPOSAL--TO 1962
 
The movement for a deeper channel in the James began 
in 19L~8 .. 3 Many persons and organiza t ions pre sen ted v ie,,'s and 
1 1-", , d 1q 
') 
Ibid ., Sec. LC' L 
. -) l~., ,) e c • ~ • 
3 News itom in The Virginian~Pilot (Norfolk) , November ~ ') 7 ! , 
<C
 
57
 
findings in reports, studies, and public commentary which 
served to supplement, support, and/or oppose the recommenda­
t ions of the Corps of Army Engineers. The deve lopmen t of 
the Review Report was a slow process, representative of 
most public works. The long course, in terms of time, led 
many to believe that should the improvement ever reach 
realization, it will have become obsolete. This was similarly 
significant in the failure of efforts to complete the James 
River and Kanawha Canal crossing of the Appalachian Barrier. 
The actual study for the current proposal 't-las author­
ized by Congress in 1954-55, climaxing the first major delay 
of recognizing a "need." In seeking the authorization at 
that time, one Virginia U. S. Representative stated: til 
believe the extended delay in making this important survey 
1.has affected adversely the economic development of Virginia .. 
Maintenance authorizations to that time included budget 
items of $16,000 for survey work and $150,000 for general 
improvement to the channel. The intent of the new survey was 
to gather data on several channel depths (to thirty-five 
2 
feet) to determine the "most feasible and economic one. II 
Representative J. Vaughan Gary of Virginia, attending a Corps 
of Engineers hearing in 1955, stated that the deepening of 
the channel to thirty-five feet would "remove the last 
lNew8 item in The Virginian-Pilot, January 30, 1955. 
2Ibido 
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barrier to a tremendous industrial development • 
• • Il and 
that the area near the head of the channel was II 
. . . one 
of the few remaining sites in the United States sui ted for 
1 
basic steel production." Cost of the channel of thirty-
five feet was then estimated at more than $20 million. 
Others at the 1955 hearing included the Virginia State Ports 
Authority (VSPA) and the Hampton Roads Maritime Association; 
both supported the improvement on the basis of scarcity of 
2industrial sites on deep-water in the Hampton Roads BreB o 
The VSPA, which is charged with developing world and domestic 
commerce through ports of Virginia, stressed in their lengthy 
statement that by reason of lower or competitive port costs 
and inland freight differentials, certain bulk and general 
commodities should move to and from the United States and 
world markets through the port of Richmond. The VSPA's con-
elusions were based on information obtained from 373 firms 
1n Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia, and 
Kentucky, cons idered to be \'I1i thin the trade area of southern 
Virginia ports. The firms, exporting seventy-two commodities 
to world markets, were using other east coast ports because 
the James River Channel Hould not permit navigation by steam­
ships of sizes necessary to handle their cargoes. The report 
concluded that the annual trade through Richmond would in­
cpease by 21+8,691 tons of exports and 245,232 tens of imports. 
• 
1 News item in The Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, December 15. 
") 
. Tb'1 d. 
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Ttl S \Nas compared to a total waterborne traffic through 
Hichmona in 195'4 of 2,469, 000 tons,	 comprised primarily ot' 
I
sand,	 gravel, shells, and petroleum. 
The statement by the VSPA further emphasized the poten­
tial for industrial development and expansion on a large 
section of the river as a result of a deep-water channel, 
because of the support that port development and industrial 
expansion provide one another. Still another advantage ot' 
these sites was the desirable decentralization of mass produc­
tion industries for economic, as well as national security, 
2 
reasons; James River sites were within the meaning ot' this .. 
The VSPA statement outlined t'ive steps necessary :for 
the development of Richmond as a port: 
1., Deepen the river channel to thirty-five or more :feet. 
2.	 Obta in favorable inland freight rates for potent ial 
import-export commodities. 
3.. Establish satisfactory steamship services to Darts of 
export recipients and import suppliers.
 
!_~. Develop port facilities suitable for handling a
 
diverse number of commodities. 
5. Launch an aggressive effort to "sell" the port to 
3pot,ential users. 
1'I~h~ YirginLan-Pilot, March 22, 1956; ~nd !lIn Support, of
 
Deepeni ng and Improving the James River ••• a statemen~ oy
J 
the Vtrfdnia State Ports Authority before the Corps of lneeY'S J 
D8partm~:nt or the Army,. Hichmond, Vir nia, December 15, 19S I)'" 
? .'
- Ib 10 .. 
~ 
3NeW8	 i temin Tile Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch., reh 21, 19 
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':[1he report summarized that the only barrier to the James 
becoming one of the country I s important arteries of world 
trade was the ~T8me s itself; the improvement would provide 
hope for benef'i ts to the economy tha t would far exceed 
1
calculable costs for the work. 
'rhe or iginal authorization for costs of the survey vJaS 
$77, 000. By early 1956 total costs of prel iminary studies 
d r:' 21,-Jere adj us ted to cf)l::;> 7, 000. The Norfolk District Chief of 
Army Engineers in August, 1956, estimated total costs for the 
improvement of' *35 million 1tJith a construction period of from 
3five to six ye aI's. Early in 1957 the topographic and hydro­
graphic surveys Here reported coroplete, and a tentative plan 
for improvement was discussed with representatives of Richmond 
and Hopewell. The economic study of benefits and costs vms 
re norte d to be comp lete by 1'1arch of 1957. tt 
Progress appeared to be satisfactory, but by the end 
of 1957 considerable opposition to the improvement had, in 
effect, seized control. First, a new Blockade--a "Harnpton 
Ronds Blocl{ttde," 1,'JBS coming to the fore and, secondly, the 
!11~rsteries of ovster sead oroduction presented questions involv­
.) , c 
ing possible damagc--perhaps even total destruction--to 
'T' • " t" t "'If 1 hO'L1!·- the- .•.• r.".>,;:! "'.,_.'," un,.d·s· Y'l'l.r; in.£:m ....~h D,'1'" ' ..\, ') Y' 1 n:1 a's 0 y s .. e r 1 ne us 1 u • :.,' - • . " - ,j ~ .I -'.' 
n nd T!'lCJ I\} 
JBnunrr/22, 19 
23, 19'-,0. 
" l.JS item in 'The 'JSrc;inian-Pilot, A st 19, 19 
I 
QI\levJS it ·:'111 in T~le Nor'folk
---_.. 
a
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concern of Hampton Roads was alleged loss of port business 
through diversion to Richmond, State legislators from Hampton 
Roads lined up to back legislation sUbjecting any James River 
dredging in the oyster areas to prior approval by the State 
Fisheries Commission. Such a bl"ll wa ln duce d F b ruary 10S "tro e , 
1958, by Delegate Russell Carmeal of Williamsburg, stating 
that although Tidewater legislators had no desire to block 
Richmond's development of shipping, " . . • we do not think 
an existing industry should be threatened with destruction 
to make ,..,ay for a new one. ,,1 The State General Assembly 
passed the bill March 31, 1958. 2 
The oyster arguments, actually introduced as early as 
1955, related to the effect of deepening the channel through 
the oyster beds of the James (between Jamestown and the James 
River Bridge at Newport News); these beds were considered to 
be among the best in the world. The questions involved (1) 
the initial physical damage caused by dredging the channel 
through the oyster beds, (2) the extent to which the deeper 
channel would effect salinity of the ,..rater in the oyster bed 
areas, and (3) the degree to which salinity changes would 
invasion by a deadly oyster drill and a fungus d" ~permit lsease<>-~ 
The first problem, regarding damage to the oyster 
grounds from dredging operations, was settled relatively 
INew s item in The Virginian-Pil2.!., 1:<'e bruary 11, 195£3. 
2An Act to Prohi bit ••• the Dredging of the Ja~sJ~ 
H:1ver .~.--;; ~ate ~enate No. 2b7: Approved I'1arch 12, 19 L)£3, 
bv the Senate Bnd March 31, 1958, by the House of Delegates.
v 
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easily through recognition that some damage would occur, 
al though the Corps of Engineers promised seafood in terests 
that all possible precautions to minimize this were planned. 
Further, monetary losses Here included in cost considerations, 
and only 0.35 per cent of the 18,400 acres of public oyster 
grounds would be lost in the dredging. l 
However, the questions surrounding long-range damage 
to oyster production that might result from increased-salinity­
oriented diseases were cleared up only recently to the appar­
ent satisfaction of all. The hearings had brought vehement 
debate, but few ~~swer8. Although little guarantee of ade­
quate answers on the salinity-disease argument would be given .J ." 
by such tests, it was decided in 1958 that the Corps would 
hold up the project to permit consideration of a proposal to 
construct a scale model test of the James River basin at the 
U. S. Army Corps of Engineers Experiment Station at Vicksburg, 
Mississippi. The announced purpose of the model would be to 
determine what would happen to currents and salinity, con­
sidered to be IIjust right lt for Virginia's world-famous oyster 
seed beds.? However, debate on the value of the model study 
held up even that phase of the review, as well as all State 
action, until 1 96L4­ and did not become conclusive until 
December, 1966, as discussed in the next section of this 
I t Th h O ther confrontations met efforts to beginC 1ap .En' • ,oug 
----. -----­ --- _._---­
1 ," o. 
?News item in The Virginian-Pilot, A st Fi, 1958. 
Q
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work on the project, The Virginian-Pilot reported that in 
1958 the only obstacle was the State law forbidding dredging 
without approval of the Fisheries Commission. l 
Throughout the long preliminary study period of the 
improvement proposal, the oyster question was considered 
" ••• a dam in the way of a deep-1.J'ater channel ••• to 
the State capital.,,2 Nevertheless, the Army Engineers reported 
that they had completed their survey in August, 1958; accord­
ing to a Corps spokesman, "The facts are all in . . . and only 
await typing up for the report.,,3 
JParamount of the interests supporting the James River 
Improvement were those cities so situated as to most greatly 
benefit from the project. In May, 1958, the City of Richmond 
adopted an ordinance which promised an amaZing amount of 
sponsorship including vast disposal lands, easements, long-
range maintenance, assumption of liability for various damages, 
relocation of utility and road structures, and expansion to 
provide adequate terminal facilities. 
The City of Richmond hereby irrevocably binds itself 
to do any and all things necessary to perform or execute 
the as surano es given . • • 4 
by tho preceding summary. 
Though Richmond's capacity to perform all promised by 
1 NoTtJS i tom in The Virgit.lian-Pi..Jo t, Novembe r 27, 1960.
 
2Ib d.
 
3Ne1"rs item in 'rho Virgi!2).an-I:il()t, August 19, 1958.
 
)jC1Ly or HichnlOnd, Virginia, Ordinance No. 150-153-1H3, 
adopted May'2B, 1958. 
611_ 
the ordinance of 1958 is subject to question, the past record 
of cooperation in James River Improvement programs spoke ",Jell 
for the effectiveness portrayed in these areas. 
The ci ty of HopevIell, by comparison, passed a resolu­
ti on II in favor If of the plan, but came forth Hith no promi se 
1 
of tangible support.- As indicated by past sponsorship of 
Hiver prograrn.s, Hopel«1ell officials had promised little more 
than verbal support for the improvement,2 although in the 
area of industrial potential they could anticipate much 
greater growth than those of the older, more developed river 
basin at Richmond. 
1Jiord of completion of the survey by the Corps of 
Engineers in August, 1958, and Richmond's enthusiastic atti­
tude apparently gave Virginia Governor J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., 
considerable encouragement to seek action. In January, 1959, 
Attorney General Albert S. Harrison, Jr., ansvJered an appeal 
from the 70VEJrnor for a ruling on the extent and intent of 
I/ • • 0 H' 0 h . r'< • ~ n 0the veto pm-Jer held by t h e v lrglnla ~'lS _erles ,-,omnllSS.LO_i. 
If T am of the opini on tha t the governor can not act upon the 
application for approval of the improvement until there has 
. b t' " •0been • • • favorable . . • recommendatIon y ne GOmmlssIon 
,.". ,,3 m~ l{ea' i'hat he "a'" " . . .0o f r'lsherles. L'llGr;OVernorrep--~ G_'V vJu 
, d' IJ.inclined to f0110'\>J the 8ttorney sonoral s a \ilee.· 
1 ' .. '. d 1 r t\· '.''; ·ty r>Oll~C'1 1 "P,' t' r"'~ (',: f-'"
-A rO~jOlutlon adopto )J ,no VL v>,ll' __ \J, '.le '-''-G,l 
, . \ 1 ""-8 V of trcpowoll, Vi inia, October lq,'1,') , 
) .~- I:)-"(lor \[il-'·-~n;a Ot~ cit ..
,uHoviov.r r~oport on dameS'll, - .... , .•.. -:. he ~c, --.-L' , 
e··1.. '7:'.1.. -q, C,oJ,t'() t~h(:J P3st cooperation of bothc !:.~ ._ _ cities. 
'rhe Vi r.d nil1n-Ptlot,, .Janua ry 
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Debe. te on the need for a model study on the salinity 
-

Question continued in 1960. Nevertheless, the Corps of 
Engineers, having consulted with numerous marine biologists 
and other experts, reported that to the satisfaction of the 
Corps a mOdel study was not needed and damage to oysters was 
not anticipated. They released word that the survey work 
was comple ted and that their report vlOuld recommend a channel 
of thirty-rive feet (at a cost of $35 million), with an alter­
nate channel depth of thirty-two feet (at a cost of $32 
• 1 1 • )nn_~ lon • However, before the report could be made public, 
they c1a1"1:r ied, it was subject to review by the Chief of the 
Corps of Army Engineers, the Secretary of the Army, the U. S. 
Board of Hi vers and Harbors, and '.nrious Congressional Com­
1)mittees (including the Budget Committee. 
The Corps f Review F~eport was Bmade public" by its 
printing on September 27, 1962, eighteen months after its 
completion. As finally published, it recommended: 
• . .. that the authori ty for the improvement, if and 
when granted by Congress, shall expire after a period of 
five vears if the governor of Virginia has not endorsed 
the m~d ified project 1..rithin that time. 2 
AntlcipatinfJ' loss of some--but not all--of the petrol­
- ~ -~ 
Gum traffic on the James River because of a proposed pipeline, 
the Review RepOl'·t also presented a second "benefit-cost ratiol! 
determinat:i on for a ehannel of thirty-five feet, l-.rhich al101:'Jed 
Ip . . t .l\JewS 1 em lTI 
Sec. 
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for loss of 60 per cent of the petroleum savings to the 
Dipeline. The adjusted ratio was 1.3 to 1. Early in Septem­
ber, 1962, the Norfolk Ledger-Star stated that because (1) 
the proposed pipeline would take away the need for the river 
channel and (2) there were supertankers being developed that 
would be too large for the channe 1 of even thirty-five feet, 
a resultant complete failure by tankers to use the channel 
II ••• might well deal a death blow to Richmond's maritime 
aspirations."l In 1962 giant tankers, some exceeding 100,000 
",~ 
tons, were almost scraping the bottom of Hampton Roads channel ~J 
~B 
of forty feet. More recently, in January, 1967, this poten­
tial threat to the usefulness of the improved James was 
exempl j fied when tr-w huge vessels had to shift from berths 
forty feet deep at Newport News to those of forty-five feet 
at Norfolk in order to complete loading, the latter channels 
having been deepened only 1>Jithin the Drevious year. The 
requirements for very-deep-draft channels arrived some time 
ago; the preceding were not simply isolated cases. Channel 
deopening efforts in established ports barely have kept pace 
with the demands; other reports included arrivals or depart­
ures of loaded vessels hli th drafts of forty-three feet four 
inches, forty-two feet, Bnd forty-one feet eleven inches. A 
recen;t aP1C_St " 1 on B lq.. O,ODO-ton ship under constt'uotion in 
its Drovsllor, alone twenty-eiGht feet inEurope pictured , , 
item (Norfol k). SODtember 10, 
1
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1 
diameter. 
}<'or completeness, the Review Report also showed that 
a total los s of petroleum traffic on the James would result 
in transportation savings of only $1,413,000 l.oJ'ith a subse­
quent benefit-cost ratio of 0.72--1es8 than unity, which is 
, d f 't'f' t·· 2requlre or JUs 1 lca Ion. 
Tentative approval by the Senate Public ltJorks Commi ttee 
and the Comrn ittee of the Budget for the $39 million expendi­
ture ",Jas granted in September, 1962, subject to endorsement 
within five years by the governor of Virginia. 3 
IV • AFTERYLATH OF 'l'HE 1962 REVIEW REPORT ON 
.TAiVIES RrVER, VIRGINIA 
The Corps of Engineers Review Report triggered con­
s iderable rebuttal and counter-rebuttaL Throughout 1962, the 
availability of the Army Engineers' fllong-awaited't recommenda­
t ions brought on renewed, though feH new, argumen ts. The 
had aptly referred to the dispute as flsquab-
J­bll among several bran~hes of the State governmenlJe n4 The 
squabble ew to include cities, port and industrial authori­
ties, trade associations, unions, and some evidences of 
.. , 
:-""'--'-'-
and NetA/s item in the Ledger ...Star, December 10, 
:JC lQr-,7. F"'bruarv 22, 19b7,· and April 6, 1 7.1966; c-:J, .. ~,-,{, Q J 
2 Heport on ---,-__8 Ri.ver, 
OC '71.II 
? 
'--- -83NcHvS item in 'rhe Virginian-Pilot, September , 1 
st 19, 19 1; .. 
"~0,%j;·""'---­
~:-;;_3f:--~': 
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disgruntlement toward Virginian resistance was implied by the 
Corps	 of Engineers. The District Engineers Office stated: 
The single greatest potential advantage in deepen­
ing the James ••• is the attraction it would become 
for many industries that are always looking for deep­
water. But you don't have to look that far ahead to 
see substantial progress in the development of the 
James l • • • If there were any economic loss to 
Hampton Roads, it would be offset in a net ~ain to 
•	 02the entlre State. 
Irvine R. Smith, Mayor of Portsmouth, in 1962 reflected 
on the alarm with which Hampton Roads initially viewed the 
opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway. He observed the apparent 
total	 lack of damage to Hampton Roads' port business wi th a 
general national benefit. Comparatively, he anticipated that 
the James improvement would be a help to Virginia through a 
better competitive position with North Carolina, also without 
-- R d 3adverse effects on Hampton oa s. 
The Hampton Roads longshore unions adopted a resolution 
of opposition in October, 1962, outlining the following: 
1.	 The facilities in Hampton Roads were operating at 
only sixty per cent of capacity with more new 
facilities under construction. 
'). Trade divers i on ,4ou1d !treduce t he pre st ige II of'-. 
Hampton Roads as one of the world'S great ports. 
Cargo" divers ion to Ri cb..mond would Ie ad to unem­3. 
ployment. 
The great cost of dredging the James would take4. 
money need ed in Iiampton Road s. .. . 4 
Fresh water of the James was needed by Vlrglnla. 
J News itom in the Ledger-Star, July 19, 1962. The latter 
reforence is to the benefits-cost advantage. 
')N'
'-_letoJs	 item in the Led~er-Star, September 20, 1962. 
3NOvJS	 item in the Ledger-Star, October 9, 1962 0 
If Nows	 item in the Ledger-Star, October 31, 1962. 
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Presumably, item five referred to potential pollution of the 
river by industry and shipping. Much of the statistical 
portion of the resolution had been reported earlier by Norfolk 
State Senator Edward L. Breedon and the Norfolk Marine Term­
ina ]_SSOClaA • t·lone 1 
Among the usuccess stories lt of other river ports pre­
vailing in the argumentation in 1962 were the cases of the 
Ports of Houston, Texas, located in the center of great natural 
petroleum re sources, and the Dela'l1Jare River, wi thin the na t ion IS 
largest population area. According to James N. Crumbley, 
representing the Norfolk Port and Industrial Authority, these 
examples litTere 1:eing over-emphasized, for "Richmond and the 
James Hiver basin can boast neither of these e ,,2 This should 
have suggested a need for more quantitative analysis of the 
developmental issue, rather than limiting it to the exploita­
tive aSDects of federal benefit-cost criteria. 3 Neither 
Grt~bley nor the Review Report specifically placed much empha­
sis on the developmental values of the James, although all 
surely recognized this as perhaps the greatest question rela­
tive to the potential of the James basin. 
INews item in the Ledger-Star, September 4, 1962. 
?1' • • t h L d or Star November 8, 1 q62.l\Jet'lfS ltem In . e e Id.' - , 
3See Lansing,2£.. cit., citing H. Jerome C:ar;merl~ 
Studies in Income ;nd Wealth, Vol. 24 (Princeton 0nlv~rslty 
Press, l%O}, p~ r.;r;9. Cr'amner distinguished behJee~ 'deve~op­
mental" ond H exp10itntive ll canals; the former \-Jere lntendeo 
to stimulate economic birth in a region, the latter were 
nrovidod to loan profits from already-developed areas. 
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The Hampton Roads Maritime Association (HRI~) in 
earlier hearings had nobly supported the James River improve­
ment as a good thing for Virginia. But in September, 1962, 
a representative of the HR¥ill reported: 
Thorough study and re-evaluation of the economic
 
impact of the proposed deepening ••• upon the Hampton
 
Roads area should be made for the Association's guid­

ance as to its future attitude toward this project. 1
 
This reflected a definite middling-of-the-road on the part of 
this Hampton d.oads organization (see page 58). In October, 
1962, the HRY~ stated that the Corps of Engineers had failed 
to consider If three negative aspects": 
1.	 Besides the "benefits ll , there would 1:B cargo
 
losses to Hampton Roads.
 
2. Adverse effects on the State's valuable seafood	 "'" 
" 
industry.
3.	 No new commerce "JOuld be created by the channel­

deepening; therefore, any commerce gai~ed upriver
 
would be diversion from Hampton Roads.
 
It apnearerl that the Hampton Roads Maritime Association finally
 
had bogun to review some very old reports on this issue!
 
Donald C. Hill, Chief Engineer for the Virginia State
 
Ports Authori ty, reported in October, 1962:
 
The proposal ••• has di videa t~e peop~e of Vi:Tginia,
 
We're not interested so much in the Yort of ~orfolK,

• • •	 . P f R' h . t"or the Port of Newport News, or the ort a . 10 mond. ~e re 
interested in the ports of Virginia.3 
Sneaking at a civic organization meeting in Norfolk, Mr. Hill 
1	 '--'" 
INeW8	 i tern in the ~dger..Star, Oc tobe r 27, 1962. 
,	 lQ lQ/?3Cited in The VLrginian-Pilot., October .~u, _,b~. 
__
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cited the example of the development of Houston as a deep­
water port. Questioned as to what happened to Galveston, 
past which the Houston canal runs, he stated that Galveston 
was ruined--but, Galveston had never been a natural port. 
"\rJe [the proponents] will not take any trade from the rest 
of Virginia. We will take some from Bal t imore and New York, It 
1he advocated. 
On the industrial question, The Ric~mond News Leader 
renorted that although the newspaper had no desire to see the 
Tidewater country converted into another Ruhr Valley, n . . . 
we do feel that a wider and deeper James would open up areas 
2 
for desirable new industry. 
The Ledger-Star in August, 1962, summarized the con­
tents	 of a letter to the City Council (Norfolk), recommending 
the opposition of the Norfolk Port and Industrial Authority 
for adoption by the Council. The letter stressed eight 
It '"'ts:economlC pOln 
1.	 'I'he benefits-cost ratio of the Review Report is 
marginal and will become sub-marginal with con­
struction of the proposed pipeline. 
2. No net economic gain would be realized by the State 
insofar as additional cargo is concerned. 
3.	 A deep-water port at Richmond would deal B fatal 
(3ffect on many small tOl..Jing and barge compaJlies 
?"'. t oJ' 1' J ~ c t' "1" ..,'l".,t 17., 1962.Al1.,CY ·\.,1 ell	 In .jO(jr;e.,-~) c>, ... '­
_h__",""",~ __~·	 ·~~ ~--
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engaged in JamB 8 Ri ver aervi ce. 
4.	 Revenue by rail and truck lines (between Richmond 
and Hampton Roads) would be cut by diversion of 
River traffic to large ships. 
S.	 The trade terri tory that would use Hichmond would 
develop at the expense of Hampton Roads. 
6.	 Millions of dollars have been invested to develop 
the State I s "primary ports. II 
7.	 It is doubtful that a thirty-five foot channel 
would be adequate for heavy industry requirements. 
8. Construction and maintenance of the deeper channel 
would	 compete for funds available to the Norfolk 
lDistrict. 
Hotivation in the above, as in most Hampton Roads, opposi­
tion was quite obvious. Nevertheless, items one and seven 
deserved more consideration than they have received to date. 
Anotber of the early reports issued on the heels of 
the 1962 Hevie1i Report t.,ras published April 1, 1963, and pre­
sented the results of a relatively professional study con­
ducted for the Norfolk Harine Terminal Association (NNTA)--a 
strong opponent of the improvement--by three faculty members 
2 
of the Colle of William and Mary. This report , seeking to 
INeW's	 itom in the Ledger ...Star, August 29, 1962. 
2Charles	 L. Quittm&ver, Anthony L. Sancetta, and Robert 
L. Knox Sorm3 anomie Con~eouences of a J f5-foot Ch8n~~1 to 
H:Lchmond - :c:or;c;)"rr11nfTDiversT;;n:-ofTraffIc, Costs nnd J2~Qt~.Ei~s, 
nn (1:"'1)01"' t 31 t () s--{Norf01k-:---Nori:;"olki'1ar 1n8--'l'8 1'1'11 i na 1 Ass oc is ti on, 
:-(/.-1 -~ ~-~~.J },J, , • 
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show why the Project improvement was not justified, first 
surveyed lOLl· executives of port-oriented firms in the Hampton 
Roads area on the probable effect the channel would have on 
the wages and salaries, employment, and revenue of their firms. 
Their conclusions in this area quantitatively parallel much of 
the Hampton Roads-oriented response received in a recent sur­
1 
vey conducted for this report. Briefly, the report concluded 
from the survey that the medium-range effects 2 on Hampton 
'" 
Roads would be a loss through freight diversion of $45 million 
in revenues, a loss of $22 million in wages, and a loss of 5100 
jobs. The report recommended that, although not a net loss to 
the State, th is "economic d is location in the Hampton Roads area 
with attendant problems • •• " should be weighed against a \ 
3benefit-cost ratio realistically below 1.1 0 
The second question taken up in the NI~A study was a 
re-analysis of the "benefit-cost ratio" of the R~~Je,..r Report. 
The latter had included in their study a benefit-cost ratio 
which anticipated adjustment should the then-proposed petrol­
Gum pipeline be provided to Richmond. The Corps I adjusted 
ratio was 1.3, omitting sixty per cent of saVings on pstrol­
o um trans porta t ion c 08 ts. However, the NNTA report 1,-JaS 
conducted during construction of the pipeline, cornpletion of 
lSection V, this chapter.
 
~ ~ r"ned as ten ~.,Te8rs
\~as us. L after completiondimn-raYl/;;e J 
of tho 1rnpro vement.
 
. t c:; . ('
 
.., "t and Knox, QE. ~., ~ec. v •JQUl tmoyor, Saneetta, 
J:~" 4 
~ 
~~'-2~" 
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Hhlcn immed iat e ly invalidated the 2. 2-to-l rat io, di scussed 
in the first section of this chapter. The NMTA study further 
pointed up tha t Federal cost-benefi t ratio analysis ignores 
where diversion occurs, although such point of diversion is 
of great significance to those firms and ports involved. 
Relative to the measurable benefits to the State of Virginia 
as a whole, the NMTA contended that a total of $289,610 in 
transportation savings reported by the Corps "t.Jould be throUGh 
diversions from Hampton Roads and should not be included in 
'cq 
benefits to the State. Combining this with the fact that the ~ 
pipeline could handle eighty per cent of the petroleum needs 
of Richmond, they contended that the final benefit vJ'Quld 
. 1 
drop to $2,271,390.­
Regard in'g costs, the NMTA study entirely refuted the 
2 S/8 per cent interest rate applied to the Federal invest­
mont, explaining that the fifty-year-life basis for the 
improvement required use of a rate of at least 3 7/8 per cent, 
if not four. The report alleged that the actual cost to the 
Government would be based on the higher rates applied to 
lo:n:z:.~~:..rm maturi ties, instead of the average cost of Federal 
bonds of ma turities bet"tveen fifteen and fifty years. Apply­
ing the 3 7/8 per cent rate, the report concluded that net 
cost (annual charges) for the improvement would anproximate 
? $2,4Elc;,t4.OO ",rith a benefit-cost ratio calculated as follmoJs:~· 
;)
n) j d. 
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Net Bene fit s 
== $2,~71Ll2..Q Net-Costs $2,4·B5,400 
The Nr~rA's final argument was tha~ although the question 
of industrial site needs was not specifically mentioned by the 
Revie~ ReEort,considerable emphasis had been placed on this 
"benefit" of the project--an implication llwithout evidence" 
that there was a lack of deep-water sites in the Hampton 
Roads area. Listing several large sites, the report con-
eluded: 
1.	 Any assumption that the Hampton Roads area is 
devoid of industrial sites appropriate for 
large-scale industrial development is incorrect. 
2.	 There exist a sufficient number of sites which 
have deep-water frontage, making them attractive 
to port-oriented industries. l 
However, one of the final remarks of the NMTA report stated: 
? 
"Admittedly, these sites constitute a short-run situation."~ 
One organ izat i on which had men ti oned the "alleged" 
site deficiencies was the Peninsula Port and Industrial 
Authority. Primarily responsible for development on the 
north side of Hampton Roads, this authority stated early in 
1962 tr1at "many requests for sites on deep-water were turned 
bl	 "'xa--Dl AfHV'I.:lY because . not aval. I a _8. ,,3 Th'1 s la s an '" til,_'0sltes \..;ere ,.v 
of lack of concurrence betHeen tvJO Hampton Roads organizations. 
Hebut tal to the NMTA t S report came from several pro­
pononts of the improvemen t.. Frank A. Ernst, Chairman of the 
c 
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Virginia Ports Authority, cited cases where industrialists 
had sought in vain for sites in Tidewater, Virginia, with 
ample fresh water, adequate highway and rail access, and 
deep-water navigation. The Hampton Roads sites did not 
offer sufficient fresh water, and those on the James River 
ldid not offer efficient navigation. 
The Corps of Engineers defended the interest rate 
applied as that rate provided by the Treasury Department as 
an average cost of managing a portion of the Federal debt. 
The same rate was used in other public works studies, includ- :~ 
ing several w~ich had justified improvements to the channels 
of Hampton Roads. Relative to the savings benefits, the 
spokesman for the Corps stated: 
If you can do something cheaper by method A than 
you can by method B, we figure that as favorable to 
method A • • •• The purpose of the public works 
proGram was to foster efficient use of natural re­
sources. Benefits credited to a project are anything2that increases efficiency of a resource's use. 
Though someone may get hurt, Itthe long-run national interest 
lS. served,··It h..:8 L~.:al·d.3_ 
The NMTA also had solicited changes of views by early 
proponents. One reply from the American Nerchant Marine 
Institute, Inc. I), in January of 1963 agreed tha t per­
haps the d~3Q.E~ning should be re-evaluated in view of the 
1 i 01tl eve:r ,Affect of a petroleum products pipeJine to Virginia. t:r 
VLr,'-lnian-Pilot, F'ebrun ry 9, 1963. 
--,,-~.l_ _~~~1 NCHvS it em in The . _ 
~ 3Ib id.LIbid. 
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the ANIvII reaff1.rmed their position, a matter of record, that 
there was an acute need for eliminating or considerably 
reducing navigation difficulties and hazards on the James. 
Specifically, widening the channel, easing bends, providing 
a mooring basin at Hopewell, and enlarging the turning basin 
1 
at Richmond Deep Water Terminal were still advisable. 
The Governor's James River Study Commission (Commission) 
was established in March, 1962, by the Virginia General 
Assembly. Its seven mem ters lfJere appointed in June, 1962, 
and were instructed to present their findings to the governor 
in November, 1963, for consideration by the 1964 General 
Assembly. 
The Study Commission received and reviewed reports and 
commentary from over 150 firms and individuals. Little new 
in concept developed; most presentations were along the same 
lines already discussed. Among "nevJ evidence" presented Has 
a report by B. W. Miller, Jr., Richmond harbor master, that 
at least a half-dozen firms had decided against riverside sites 
;::J 
because the present channel was only twenty-five feet deep.­
, (' . . 1 "0'" "Tot-nlAt the second hearing of ~he vommlsslon, an appea. ~U~~L 
h k an of the Peru1insula Committee forwas ma.e ~Y a spo.esm .d 
Parks and PlanninG (north side of Hampton Roads). Mrs. 
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Sandridge Evans stated: 
The problem you (the Commission) are being asked 
to judge seems to us a single-project, single-purpose, 
single-agency proposal .•• several generations old 
in its th inking • • • • We must seek a proper balance 
in all rather than some of our plans. l ­
Retired seaman A. B. Butterworth at the same hearing 
told the Commission: 
vle should be fair and honest about this matter •••• 
Facts and history have taught us Americans that retarding 
progress f9r a fallacy should have no place in our scheme 
of th ings. -. 
The oyster question and an insistence for a scale model 
study of the James to be conducted at Vicksburg was re­
emphasized. Mr. Donald C. Hill, Virginia State Ports Authority, 
reported that although it had not been l-Jidely publicized, model 
test data would 1:e of little value to the oyster mystery. 
Nevertheless, opponents insisted it would produce conclusive 
salinity-cbange data that 1t1Ould help determine the anSv19rs 
boi 
(rhe Virginian-Pilot in December, 1962, reported that 
tho Cornmission had collected all its data and forecasted that 
the report to follow would recommend further studies, whether 
or not it favored the deepening. 4 Three days before, the 
hua,d d esc r :L'hedOJ ., v ~Dt·l·ons- L J..~a~in~~~. b th'lB,- Commission aspapG r t'·h· A qu u u ,. ~ 
follows: 
L.lC ited: :in The Yi~tl.jnian-P:ilot, Dtember 6, 1 ? 
2 '0~_.!:.:.:.. .. 
•
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One ri ver cruise, ,~i ve PU?lic hearings, one scientific 
conf~rence, and one f leld trl plater, the conani t tee found 
the, Job [~~ evaluatir;g ?ysters versus trade and industry" 
about as 01mple as plcklng up an oyster with your elbowe~ 
l,. '··h ".j t . It bTh
·.OUgl1 L, e ca a was ln ,y the end of December, the Commission 
Itstudied lt the problem through much of 1963. As late as Septem­
ber, 1963, a closed door session was held '1iJith John Ge Iv"J.ackin, 
head of the biolo[sy department at Texas A. and r1. and an 
acknowledged expert on oyster diseases e ~mckin presented 
data disputing claims that previous dredging of the James had 
damaged the seed bedse The records he produced showed that 
seed oyster hauls from the James had actually increased follow­
. ?ing previous deepenlngs.­
Shortly before the Study Commission issued its report, 
The Virginian-Pilot presented the stand of Mrs. Gladys L. 
Fraser, a Hampton Roads candidate for the House of Delegates: 
The deep-channe 1 plan "is not a spur-of-the -moment 
decision [but) a carefully thought out plan to cut 
short our industrY and build up the empire of the [~yrdJ orRanizati~n • • •• To openly permit ••• 
oc~an traffic that still enters our port to be switched 
to the warehouses and railhead of Richmond would be to 
permit our vJharves to rot away and our business to 
'·TJ;ndl" t.o the scraDS and leavini7s of .•• Richmondd ll\! ... ._~j ,"" t C) 
on·~ ·t-he north This plan is insidious and dis-
C:l.l\..A.· - __ . .1 •.••• _--~ _.' "'. 1t3 
astrous to overy citizen of our commllrlltYe . 
Soon Bfter l'1rs. F'raser1s profound remarks, Norfolk 
Delegate "Y'_. OVIDnaro' L . frankl'JT and honestly expressed the gen­
eral position of Norfolk: 
~ f' itT C' F··I'··"ht (jn1u Thi That'si J 1 , Don D ] CJ "., t.J ame " c~ ~. " ~ ,1 . ". 
I c/ '"' Th. r . !. _ lD J.an - , , ...\'.r_l.,::-J."'.:.::..:,:.:·:.=:.:._.-"t~~·. ;lcll- December 23, /01'.:. 
eNS it orn in The 
road [1 
or tho 
'Ih:i s 
n EJi·J spa t) e r~ s 
•
 
80 
The Norfolk delegation is politically obligated to 
oppose the channel because of Norfolk's interest in it. I 
At last someone was straight forward enough to admit why they 
opposed itJithou t the camouflage of oyster shells, etc! 
The James River Study Commission published and pre­
sented to the governor its report in November, 1963, as 
instructed. Of the seven members of the Commission, only 
Harvin L. Armory of Hampton failed to join the majority, 
itJhich concluded that both HopevJell and Richmond could be made 
deep-Hater inland ports without impairing the port busine ss 
of Hampton Roads or materially damaging the valuable seed 
2
oysters. The Commission's recommendations were as follows: 
1.	 A hydraulic model should not be constructed, since 
only sixty-five of 18,400 acres of public oyster 
ground s 'l-J ould be 10 s t to dredging opera ti ons and 
methods to prevent siltation in seed ted areas 
would be employed. Claims of oyster bed destruc­
tion by previous
_ 
dredging were not verified;v 
available evidence indicated the seed beds were 
not affected. Cost of the scale model study 
Hould be ~:; 300,000 and three ye aI'S in time and 
would not answer questions on oyster damage. 
2.	 Tho power of the Fisheries Commission to veto dredg­
i ln the James should be repealed. 
inle) Senate 
inis, 1 3), 
""" 'Wt~':~~~~~;; 
"~-,,,,<;> 
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3.	 The consideration of permitting Richmond the author­
ity to cooperate with the U. Stand
.• governmen to 
give other assurances needed should be made with­
out delay. 
The report further concluded that cargoes likely to go to 
Richmond and Hopewell would be bulk commodities which would 
not require transhipment in the Hampton Roads area. Further, 
the fears of those in Hampton Roads that efforts to attract 
nelPJ port illsiness might be impaired It ••• in our opinion 
I 
• are	 gr01.mdle s s. II 
Mr. Armory's statement, presented in the report, 
vehemently denounced the majority findings as incomplete, 
ch8rging that to go ahead with the improvement without a model 
study would be "capricious and irresponsible. Virginia 
Hi 11 be throwing 81,.;ay a valuable economic resource [ oysters] 
for the mirage of a pOGSl'b'.Le ..'R 11h r along "L'he J ames 'R'_.lver. 112 
He further called for a huge appropriation to support the 
oystermen for many years in the event the majority proposal 
1..JBS adopted. 11 I see no merit to spreading an already too 
" h ~small	 port eusiness among more ports, e said.~ 
Nevortheless, the Commission urged expediency in tting 
the project under 1.,Jay. One newspaper, indicating the vornor 
would be committed to the findings of the Commission, antici­
pated sponsorship by the administration of legislation to Dush 
,	 1 A bl~ The nrime obstaclefor approval in the GenBra~ 8sem -J. . 
2 Ib id., pp. IS, 16.lJjdd., pp. 7-10 • 
.) )lb i. d ., p, 1 S. 
Q
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would be removal of the veto power of the Fisheries Commission, 
which had to be a pproved by the House Committee on the 
Chesapeake and its ~ributaries, heavily dominated by oyster 
i.nterests. An alternate 't<JaS to dismiss that Committee, 
though this was reported as a very unpopular, last resort. l 
Norfolk Delegate Bernard Levin indicated all but one or two 
of the thirteen members of the committee were expected to 
oppose a deeper James. 2 The Ledger-Star stated that It • . . 
the HhoIe business is emished [sic.] in so much politics it 
has become a very touchy Subject. ld The Star generously called 
the report of the Commission II . . . one impressive verdict,fl 
stating of the findings: 
Judgement was fair and responsible .••• This 
newspaper is already on record against the kind of 
Tidewater opposition which springs purely from fear 
thnt Hampton Hoads shipping will be diverted up­
stream•. The industrial development of the hinter­
land served by the James ought to commend more 
attention than any sectional interest. I 
Novertheless, the editorial indicated, "Thepe's no tearing 
I'U sh • • • . Indeed, the extra time Lfor further study] could 
r 
'f t' tl)be profitably used to update the whole range 0 f In ormalon. 
Governor Albertis S. Harrison, having declared him-
sa If proch annel, as ked the General As sembly to re turn the 
INews item in The Virginian-Pilot, December 11, 1963. 
') 
'~Tb j d. 
item in tho Ledger-Star, 
T .)(\
,JUnuary .)'-', ~Q/! .L .ou.. 
item in tho . CtLodger:-~) a1' (an oditorial), January 
?9.19(1).• 
[~)Tbid. 
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channel approval p01<rer to him in January, 1964, through a 
bill introduced by Ifhis cohorts in the Senate. ltl As antici­
D.ated, the bill was 08].. d up l·n the , House Committee, but in 
February a compromise was reached. The veto power was 
removed from the Fisheries Commission. However, dredging in 
the James between Jamestown Island and James River BPidge 
(oyster area) could not be authorized by the governor until 
he received advisory reports from (I) The Virginia Institute 
of r'1arine Science, (2) 'rhe State irlater Control Board, (J) 
The Commission of Fisheries, (4) The Commission of Game and 
Inland F'isheries, (5) The Board of Conservation and Economic 
Development, (6) The Virginia State Ports Authority, and 
(7) The State Highway Commission, plus the formal consent of 
the General Assembly. All advisory reports had to be made 
by Au st 1, 1967, to be transmitted by the governor to the 
next regular or special session of the General Assembly. 
Approval of both chambers of the General Assembly was needed 
to begin vlOrk; fa ilure to act on the question by ei ther or 
2 
both houses would be deemed granting of consent. A grant of 
300,000 Has to be ma de to the Fi sheri es Commi ss i on for 
II h ll ·bl ter d"ma~e 1'_ hI· S cou·l._d jnc1.ude theresearc on POSSI e 0Y8 '1:1 , b .. - ­
' 'contr.·avers]·al model stud,r, thouf7)h not specif­t Hne-consumlng, _ u._ 
'( 
• 1· 1 Jlca~y. 
lNOvJD ~tern"ln 'T'hA VirG'-inian-Pilot, January 10, 196[;: 
Hnd T'-St.~r,'Jn~u9~Y~30, 19Gb.• 
') " P·lot fi'ebrUflT'y 12. 196u.o
'Hoported in The Vlri:pnlan- 1 ..... , _ 7 
-~Tbid. 
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The net result of this legislation, besides more study, 
lwas another delay of at least three and one-half years. As 
a result, the remainder of 1961+., 1965, and most of 1966 pre­
sented relatively little on the issue. Though some of the 
studies called for by the 1961+. legislation were begun, the 
development of these studies received little attention until 
late in 1966. The pipeline to Richmond was completed in the 
fall of 1964, and Humble Oil Company, alone, annolillced plans 
to transfer ninety per cent of their Richmond-bound petroleum 
products from River transportation to the pipeline. The Corps 
of Army Engineers reported that their anticipated new review 
of the project would uncover new unevaluated benefits, bene­
2 
fits in areas not requiring previous evaluation. 
The Corps joined the Virginia Institute of ~~rine 
Science in co-sponsorship of the model study, which inevitably 
began in August, 1 961+. , lmder the title nCrash Operation James 
R' II The Corps, "rho had never considered the model study.. lver. 
imperative to the immediate question, justified this co­
sponsorship because of potential value to their interests in 
3 Althou,.~h the Corps of Engineers advocatedf u t ure programs. _, 
a 1 k _ ~ to the o'Jrster beds, one of the conditions of. Be. Or th· rea·  _ 
the proje ct 't>Jas that others assume responsibi1i ty for any 
U.damages resulting from the work.· Perhaps this was the 
1 't . 1~L}lC. 
Virginian-Pilot, August 26,2News itom in Tho 
Virglnian-Pilot, August 26, 1961.1.3NEn,rsitem in ~rhe 
cit.,Soc.II H:~vJ.nH .!iQport oJ} JRmes River, 
a
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reason the Virginta State P'isheries Commission so firmly 
insisted that their interests be proved h'secure, W lch finally 
led in 1964 to the pol it ical compromise tha t, in turn, led to 
the model study. 
The second study v-laS conducted by the Virginia Marine 
Institute to determine the effects of the model-determined 
salinity changes on marine life in the James. These two 
studies, costing $680,000 and authorized in 1964 Itstruck 
d01.-Jn fears of the seafood industryll--1tJhich fears had been 
called the major source of opposition to the improvement-­
by concluding Itthat changes the project would make on the 
river bottom would not effect currents or salinity enough to 
bother oysters or other mainer [sic-- Itmarine tt ] life. lIl 
Although the model study and subsequent studies will 
serve greatly in future problem reviews of the River by many 
federal, s ta to, and local government bod ies, it confirmed in 
December, 1966, that the fears of the oystermen had been 
wrong. It was considered by many advocates of the improve­
ment to haV(3 been "in the nature of an extravagent stall to 
_..," ,,2the cjroo 1ng. 
Vlce-mayor,· of' .• Phi 1 Ba;2;ley sa id in Dec ember,R.· 1" chw.!ond J. ~-
1966, that the project It died Hhen Vaughan Gary retiredeO. 
"orl"t,r there Porter Hardy,U. S. Congress, , ld'Ine; senl J ' J tofrom Y18_ ,. v, 
INews item in The Virginian-Pilot, December 21, 1 6 
') 
! N(3v.JS 
Ii 11 d F'Bb :t'un r''y 
February 1, 1967; 
c 
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the congressman from Norfolk."l G h d ~	 ary a led the early 
project ~tudy without opposition. Bagley stated: 
The oysters were just a [political] red herring •••• 
Anyone would have to be politically naive to expect any 
action with Porter ~ardy blocking the financial bridge 
across the Potomac.-
Bagley implied that since the oyster question was 
resolved, Norfolk's representative would find a new stop-gap 
for the project. In reply Representative Hardy stated: 'There 
is a question of economic justification,,,3 since the pro­
vision of the petroleum line. The remaining question became 
clear: Had Hardy found his new political "herring," or would 
other factors influence his stand? 
V.	 SELECTIVE OPINION SURVEY ON THE PROPOSED 
JAMES RIVER PROJECT IMPROVEI1ENT4 
January 23, 1967, a survey form and cover letter were 
mailed to a selective sampling of seventy-two parties be-
Jie ved to be effected by or familiar 'Nith the James River 
T~mpro vemen t .. A pr.e-addressed, stamped return envelope_ was 
enclosed. Six of these were eliminated from the sampling 
because of duplication or newspapers, the latter in which 
amnle information, including opinions, v.JaS to be found. 
?Jbjd .. 
There! are,n a n:':.tc:: sanlpll'ng of'~ sixty-six parties was considered 
lCited in Lodger-Star, Decomber 22, 1966. 
3Ib id. 
if e flAppondix" for exhibits. 
•
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to be the base of the survey. 
Initial response by earl~y Marcin T.Tas f
'"' rom tt-lenty-six 
(forty-one per cent) of those questioned. March 13, 1967, 
a follow-up letter, accompanied by another survey form, a 
copy of the original letter of explanation, and pre-addressed 
stamped envelope, was forwarded to the thirty-nine parties 
which had not ye t responded. Of these, twelve were returned 
for a follow-up response of thirty-one per cent. The over­
all response in the survey was thirty-nine acknowledgements, 
or fifty-nine per cent. A second follow-up was judged to be 
of little further value. 
Of the thirty-nine parties responding, twenty-four 
completed the form, three felt they could not complete the form 
(per se) but volunteered assistance in the form of reports or 
additional information sources, aY1d tHelve returned the blank 
survey form l.J'i th or t'll'ithout regrets tha t they were unable to 
comment oocause of lack of qualifications or authority. 
Of those solicited, twenty-three were representatives of 
Hampton Roads interests, five of Richmond interests, tt..Jsnty-
SOVen had interest in both Hampton Roads and Richmond, and two 
wore classified as being specifically oriented toward neither 
10· Ct: SllCh· 1On +h'"v '0 cas·e of one federal ac>:encv a.'1d'at"lon, 8.S ,~ oJ one 
of tho State Senators. Nine parties were not so classified 
as to the locale of their concern, primarily because lack of 
" 
1
. The nr~~BhiY·f.:tSpOYWG presf)nted no clue to their.1oyaIt 18S." tJ· t:;V,.l.. 
lQuotattons by individuals are not footnoted here to 
t "" ," the· Q'lr'Vt"',r coveT' letter. Stato­honor' thE) statement on 'IllS In ' " ~,. ~J' ~ 
niO nt s 8;0 in tho possession of the writer. 
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was summarized in Table VII. 
'rhe primary designs of the inquiry were (1) to locate 
information sources, (2) to obtain fresh, first-hand view­
points, and (3) to evaluate opinions relative to the subject. 
As indicated under "additional information lt in Table VII, 
this goal was achieved to a reasonable degree. Of those 
responding, most gave interesting explanations for their 
responses or indicated additional available reports related 
to the subject o 
A total of eleven Virginia State Senators were included 
in the sample; four representing the Richmond-Hopewell area, 
six representing Hampton Roads cities, and one from south-
central Virginia. Three from Hampton Roads and two from the 
Richmond area failed to acknowledge the letter, two from 
Hampton Hoada felt they vlere ltunqualified to answer," and 
another returned a blank survey with no explanation, as 
determined by a code number placed on each mailed form. 
Therefore, only three of eleven State Senators volunteered 
comment.. One of these, representing the City of Richmond 
" 
and a member of the Port of Richmond Advi sory L,ommlSS. 1. on, 
explained in his reply that the: 
• trlflin~ traffic loss to Richmond would be 
u • 1 
more than of f se t by s trengthenlng the genera~ ec onomy 
of Vir inia, especially the Richmond, Petersburg,.. 
Ronewell comnlex o Richmond could never compete \\1 1 th 
Ha;pton Hoad~ as a major general cargo seaport o 
He indicated that the James River Improvement is necessary 
for tho advancement of Virginia. Further, he reported that 
t;l10• Part -f n'fiLe 1Trl0 A(~"1'",01"V ",c. - Commission had doneI"n.:! extensive0 U .- ,I' <J 
--
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TABLE VII 
SAMPLE AND EXTENT OF RESPONSE TO OPINION SURVEY 
J AMES RIVER CHANNEL IMPRDmmNT 
1967 
IS~gm.ficance of 
Representation Response 
Class and Number or Location* s:l 
of Sample H H ~.~'0 +'° §''0 0> "s:l+' ° 0>s:l s:l -0 0>::H +'~ ID..c:+' ,-i H~ ~ID .~ ~ +' ° 1Il ° +' .r! ·rl '..c: ID,-i +' s:l
.@ 0:1 ,-io 0> +' :a OID~~ ° +'C) Q) .r! s:: IJ)M~~ ·rl Q)t=Qz 'O~~-- s:l p~~!P=l~ il!~ H Z <Ht.:J·~ °
Virginia State Senators: 
1 X X X
· 2 X X
· · · 3 X X X
· 4 X X X
· · · · · 5 X X
 
6 X X

· 7 N X X
· · · · · · 8 · · X X 
9 ·
·
·
·
·
· · · 
X X X X 
· 
X X10 X X
 
11 X X

· ·· 
Other Governments, Port 
Authorities. etc. : 
XN X X12 
· X
13 X
 
14 · X X
 
· 
• 
· · · · · · X XX15 
· X X16 X
· · · · · 
X
X X X17 , X
· · · · · X X X18 , X
· · · 
• 
· B X19 
· X· · · XB X20 
· · · · 
Ter1Jli.na1 Corporations: 
X X XX
 
22
 
21 
· · · · · · X 
X23 ·
.
· · · · · · 
X 
X 
· · 
• 
· · · XX24 
· · · · 
bias by responding
vrould indicate little or no or ItNeither ll• "Both" 
party. 
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TABLE VII (continued) 
Class and Number 
of Sample 
Significance of 
fRepresentation Response 
or Location* 
s:l 
M 00H H 't:I +> Ill'Hg. "o Q)'t:I Q) s:l+>
s:l s:l Q)=H o III+>,.q:S0 Q)~ ~ ~Q) MH 'M e+> tI) ~<r'i Q)r-10 ~ t:l130 It! o Q) :S+3 ~~ ~ ~tl Q) s:l tI) :8e~~ 'M 
-.........
~] ·S Q) 't:I Q'M0txlZ ~s:lgS..............
::r:o:: H CllHd~!i: ~ = CllZ 
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TABLE VII (continued) 
Class and Number 
Significance of 
Representation 
or Location* 
Response 
'0lJ) 
+' 
l'>.a.>lJ)ri 
~! 
a 
+' 
lJ)::
ri H
rOlJ) 
ro ~ I:l tI) 
:::>>:: 
:: ~ 
~ 
ria 
Ill.,,; 
~+' 
a ro 
:.s~ j:; 
'r-! a lJ)
'OG-i> 
'0 >:: '''; 
~Hd 
ri 
ro 
'r-!
+' 
'r-! 
~ 
H 
§' 
~ HlJ)
0 ~ri
ri ''';
0 a.> 
Ixi Z 
of Sample 
I:l 
0 
+' CIl 
~] 
:r:~ 
H H
'0 a Q)
I:l 
..s::: 
a 
.c1+' 
] ro +' 'r-! a a.>C) a.> ..-.......-..,. 
iE~ P=lZ .............. 
" 
Railroads: 
54 B X X55 B
· X56 B
· X57 .
·
. . B X X58 X X· X59 B X 
60 
· 
NA X 
Banks: 
61 X X X
· · · · · · 62 B X X
· · · · · · 63 B X X
·
. .
· · · · 64 · B X X
· 65 
· · · · · · 
B X X 
Niscellaneolis: 
66 . .
· · · · 
X X X
· · 
X 
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study to reassure itself of the feasibility of the improve­
ment. 
A second State Senator, representing an area north of 
Richmond, stated that he felt the improvement would divert 
cargo handled at Hampton Roads to Richmond, thereby reducing 
"the stand of Hampton Roads Port." Though the project may 
benefit Richmond and Virginia, it would be at the expense of 
Hampton Roads and project funds could be better spent by 
investment there. Present transportation facilities serv­
ing between Hampton Roads and the remainder of Virginia mar­
kets would suffer, he added, stating that ""'Ie have the second 
best port on the East Coast, and to create an inland port 
Hould be de tr imen tal in this regard. 11 He reported that the 
James at Richmond does not have adequate harbor area for 
large ships, and such navigation t,muld be lttroublssome.1l 
Finally, he indicated that advancement of Virginia trade would 
not necessitate the improvement. 
The Senator representing an area south of the James 
and Appomattox Hi vel'S ',.JaS of the opinion that no effect on 
V''II' nia HOU result from tho improvement, and only little 
POS81L~e. hl de' t'.I"I·m","}ntJ t·o Hampton Roads ports 't-Jould develop from, , 
diversion of traffic. 
The general lack of response from Senators from the 
• 1 1 ' ,~hl'S 
.....
qubl'ectIV - is Dartlcu_ar~y 018­l; ll. L. - ~directly involved by 
couT'a;~inLs. 
Tho . ~so G 0 n (j cnt'e", (k I ", orv " J of'.)."­ tho 1samp_.8- ',Tas0­ 1l0ther Govarn­
montal "oncies, Port 't'Authorl .)8S, pt" tI",l~. Here '~!8re -includod 
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81ght industrial, port, and developmental authorities and the 
Corps of Army Engineers (discussed in preceding sections). 
Five of these responded. 'l'he Hampton Roads Maritime Assoc­
i8 t ion- -a very interested party, one would assume --answered 
through their law firm that 11 ••• we do not feel we can 
answer the questions posed inasmuch as our Board of Directors 
has taken no position on this project. 1t Perhaps they had 
forgotten the statements of their representative at a public 
he aring he Id De cember 15, 1955: 
• • • the proposed improvement will not only greatly 
benefit the Richmond-Hopewell area, but would advance 
the eo onomie interest of the State of Virginia. He 
pointed out that the lower James River basin would be 
opened to extensive industrial development, sites ior 
wbieh are not a va ilable in the Hampton Road s area. 
Perhaps, too, the HRIVIA had reason to hope their change of 
he art in September, 1962, would 1:::e forgotten. 
Other authorities in this category included the Virginia 
Stato Ports Authority, which volunteered assistance, but felt 
they could not answer the survey without considerable qualifi­
cations. 'I'h~) pro-lmprovement vieHs of the VSPA were dis­
cussed in previous sections. 
A spokesman for the Ponninsula Ports Authority of 
Virr:inia, representing interests on the north side of Hampton 
ads, indicated a belief that though the improvement would 
ba- fav 10 to RichnJOnd it Hould be detrimental to ton 
ntation of port dev opment within 
Q£."lCitini~ HOl/iew HODort
-"-- .........~.1..- .
 
Se":c. ;)3. 
a 
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the Statelt and through "di version of business and available 
State funds for facilities. 1I His organization has opposed 
and planned to continue to oppose the project at public 
hearings. 
A representative of the Norfolk Port and Industrial 
Authority stated that the River improvement would have no 
effect on the progress of Virginia, but would help Richmond 
at a loss to Hampton Roads. He emphasized that the economic 
justification for the project was gone,l requiring re-evalua­
tion of this justification before funds could be provided. 2 
According to the survey, representatives of the Tide­
water Virginia Development Council {TVDC} felt that traffic 
passing through Hampton Roads en route to James Hiver ports 
of call would benefit Hampton Roads through generation of 
additional business there and increased awareness of the 
Tidewater area on the part of shippers and shipping companies. 
Though he did not indicate a necessity for the improvement for 
the realization of growth, he agreed that the project would 
aid Vir nia, as Hell as Richmond. The official position of 
the Council ,,,Jas presented in a copy of TVDC's proposal to 
Governor lIs God1.]in (Virginia) for a dam on the James in 
" 3favor of 8 portion of the dredglr~. 
1 t 1 m n{De-ll"ne now sun.__ plyin.~~As a result of the Dero~eu,.. ~-'-, ' . - - -­
i e hmond"
 
?rr.'~ll"O T'E-,,,\'irement for re-evl:iluntion l"as c'onfirme~ " " 
.1.( ,,,--) -- .J,.",!_.(' t. "',1.· ....... 11,,1""-C''10tl
 
, ... __ . , _ , .r< 1· ,) }-( '""hief of tnt) t:.n(':lneorlnc 1,~d0.L .',Lotter 1 rom rJ,r. v. ,.• H~').Ln, v - ,.' _ .,,, 1 7 
. . .- f ., .' r' ..... :'") V"Ii Q. Li ~~"r"!'J Q PV r::!, -~ ! ..t'! 0 Y' f (] ll{ Dis t r' i c t J Go r p s () h rtn y ,', '-" 0 , ,~., ,- . " . 
(' t" - "T1, " . \ ct,) +' t 'n .;,~ (' h '"' D t,~ Y' 00 C ,1 on v.,,,
/L)(-:) [-10 an·- (i 1_[....) \J.~;:~,_ '-- - J.J 
a 
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Of five ship terminal operators solicited by the sur­
vey, comprising four in the Hampton Roads area and the only 
one in Richmond, one returned the completed form. Located in 
Hampton Roads, this operator expressed 1:Blief that his busi­
ness and the port would lose through diversion of cargo to 
Richmond. It was his opinion that simple diversion would 
ensue and the net trade of Virginia would remain uneffected. 
Expressing a desire to have more time to devote to the question, 
he indicated his efforts would endeavor to prevent the River 
improvement through educational and political means by point­
ing out ttthe negative economic effects and ••• the import­
ance of recognition of the factor of 'diversion'.11 
Seven educators of Old Dominion College (Norfolk) were 
included in the sample, primarily in hopes of obtaining 
unbiased and Hell-based responses. Of the seven, four T,Jere 
oriented j n history, hJO in pol i tical science, and one in 
economics. Four responded, of which one was "unable to 
anS1,JOr II ano, one expressed a "vague B't-JBreness" of the project, 
thou~h he did remark, "obviously--the more ports, the more 
trade." The logic behind that conclusion was not pursued 
'1 . ,- t dfurther. Of the othors completing the survey, ai~ lnalca 0 
·' d P pt"D Rnad~ h'-r bringinptho HiveI' i rnnY'ovemen t 1...Joul d a t Dam. ~. J . 0 ~),A.J. '" <. ., I ~ 
.
D.. n· d. ~l_.l.._. indicated an anticipationmore traffic to the tpar;  a· 
of improved export-import trade to Virginia throll 
port commerce for tho entire areB. 
~ol.~.. prisin.~ twenty-one
'Tho 1£1 t3St eu p surveysd , ~ ~ 
n • 
ch fourII l'.)rouuht thirteen returns, ofl-~rYonC1E)S, l. ,--) 
a 
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v-rere II unable to an swer. If Of the nine completing the form, 
it was interesting to note that seven operated offices or 
performed their services throughout Virginia. It was 
de cided the t the criteria for discussion of these would be 
to group th em by area served, relat i ve to Virginia-located 
offices. 
The two responding firms designated as operating exclu­
si vely in Hampton Roads were not entirely biased in their 
answers. Both, however, indicated that their business and 
Hampton Roads would suffer through diversion of cargo unload­
ing for western Virginia. There was disagreement that the 
improvement would aid Virginia's overall trade picture, one 
indicating that division of effort in solicitation of trade 
would result in a decrease in the number of vessels calling 
at Vir nia ports, while the other felt both Virginia and 
I-Uchmond t>Jould benefit Hi th a loss to Hampton Roads. Both 
agreed that such expenditures would better serve Virginia if 
placed in Hampton Roads improvements. One expressed hopes of 
preventing the project through the "regular channels of the 
Hampton Hoad s ri time Association, II apparently unat-Jare the t 
th tJ HRI"ii\ plan ned no su ah efforts in his beha If accord Lng to 
their latter of March 29, 1967. 
,-' Encie~ F<8-r\l1n"C' both the r.>orts ofTho seven sen ppIng ag ~ ~ ,~, - - ~ 
q ) .('1,'ld' D~ '~h.rnond' ',rere almost evenly divided as tofd1mpton honds co., !\:-L ,. - < 
• ' thol'r h'IR1'n.ess. Of thetho off(~ct of the improvemen" on . _ two _c 
era1 increBEw 
OX1"ccti incroasod business, one explained a 
· 't ~hB qecond foresaw incressedin Vir' jnin tl"'ade h1ou1d 1he,.p 1; ~." "u' .. 
Q 
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traffic through his branch office in Richmond. Of three 
anticipating no effect, two felt their firms would handle the 
same cargo through either of the two ports, and the third 
reported that hi s loca ti on of the firm in Hampton Roads 
handled coal in very-deep-draft vessels (exceeding drafts of 
thirty-one feet) and, therefore, would continue to handle the 
same traffic. The two indicating a harmful effect on their 
businesses from the project suggested the added cost of 
"scattered operations" in one case; the other considered the 
proposal to be "misuse of Virginia State funds ",rhich should be 
directed to the development of present Hampton Roads facilities." 
Five of these seven agencies indicated a harmful effect 
on Hampton Roads v.lould ensue because of diversion of freight 
loading and unloading to Richmond, but also through thinner 
spreading of available state funds. One agent specified 
that the Richmond tobacco products noW carried to Hampton 
Roads for export loading would be exported directly from Rich­
mond instead; this would have implied a justification for the 
1 povement in terms of :Federal evaluation. One agency advo­
eated that 8n improvement for Hampton Roads trade would result 
ov e l' th e lOll g -run through inereo sed traffic, wh De anot her 
. t q- ch·mond 1 TO'11 d b:rpasscould sea no raason 1:Jhy ships ea 1 1~lng a i,l, .j -- !,L~ ~ 
Hampton ROB ds. 
rding the lone-range nf t81_ Be ,s on Ha"n'-on" tflf-- v d '-/rl°d 
c 
Luu..", ono 
. L~f"
'­
t!t:~le oV81'-all development ofant described a retardotlon I 
industry in Virrinia includ 
c 
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, t' "AdlrBc lon. second expected no effect, while five suggested 
improvement to Virginia's trade development through (1) pref­
erential freight rates on cargo going to the interior, (2) 
resultant growth of heavy industrY--" the backbone to major 
port progress," (3) diversion to Richmond of cargoes bound 
from western Virginia for Baltimore export due to lower inland 
freight rates and equivalent ocean freight rates, and (4) 
diversion to Richmond of "much cargo from North Carolina 
presently being shipped through Norehead City." 
Three of the agencies serving both ports felt the 
expend it ure propos ed for the impr ovement of the James Hould 
better aid Virginia by more Hampton Roads development. Two 
considered the improvement to be necessary for the advancement 
of Vi rginia • One thought possibly only the port of Alexandria 
..wuld suffer, though Virginia in general VJould be helped. One 
ra-emphasized that raw materials would be imported to plants 
along the James, and resultant products would be exported, to 
the benefit of all. As an additional comment, one agent 
stressed that present facilities in Richmond "are quite inade­
quate and .•• would require additional State funds for 
modernization. 1t 
Soven railroads ,,",'ere included in the survey sampling, 
] d onl:,' one--which serves HamptonDnd thou h three responoe, -,' 
This lack ofItoads, but not Hichmond-- completed the form. 
believed to be based on the f8et thatresponse or comm nt was 
both ports wore served 
. " f-on' 'n~~OY'Q B instof repsrcLlssl0n.s (.".i,,_V\!G~":;_L-",per-hapB the 1'0 \Nfl n fonr 
a
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either side. The responding railroad executive indicated a 
belief that if industry developed as a result of the project, 
his business could be helped, but if the result was diversion 
of traffic, this would be harmful. He doubted that bulk cargo 
-would be diverted 8 nd this, combined with an as sumpt ion that 
James River industrial development would involve handling of 
river-side cargoes only, would have little effect on Hampton 
Roads port business. He was of the opinion that new industry 
resulting from the improvement would provide a net benefit to 
both Richmond and Virginia, hmJever. 
All forms were returned from five banks surveyed; four 
of these were completed. An executive of a bank serving lower 
Tidewater (Hampton Roads) felt the improvement would hurt his 
business through a harmful impact on shipping in Hampton Roads. 
He anticipated little effect on Virginia's trade level, pre­
ferri tho expenditure on Hampton Roads improvement in lieu 
oft h e J a me s • 
The other three banks served the entire State of Virginia. 
A rE-3presentativB of one, from a branch office in Hichmond, 
indicated only slio:ht anticipations from the project, explain­
''; '-' 
ing little knowlsd8 B on the subject. A second bBnking execu­
t ive from Hi chrnond br'is fly ansHered in ",hole-hearted support 
, t" he expected Qli
to
a htly increased businessof thE) lmprovemen" ",' .' ~ ­
l".'lc,re'ased trade for both the State
in his forei department,,­
. the'
... 
..·ing~ of a need relative to
.s~tisfV,and Hampton Roads, n11C1 _Ct - ­
tbo advnnco(rlE)nt of r' inia's trade. 
ban!{ 8xecutive, 
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indj.cated tbat he could see no effect on his business" the 
port of' Hampton Hoads, nor the State of Virginia from the 
improvement) explaining that such past efforts for develop­
ment of Richmond into 8.n ocean port were founded in a dream 
or Richmond interests v,Jho have never adequately utilized the 
available channel, even v,Jhen it was deep enough to handle 
the largest ships in use at the time. He stated, "With the 
development of' containerization, there will be less incentive 
f'or ships to make the additional journey from Hampton Roads 
to Richmond. 1I This t-JaS based on the fact that container 
pr inc iples requ ire a minimum number of brief stops--usually 
not more than two--on each end of their journBy. Further, he 
added that tr18 $40 million figure will have to be greatly 
adjusted upvJard to reflect current costs. 
The final participant in the survey stated that he vIaS 
unable to comment l:ecause he lIms nevl to the area and unfamil­
isr with the proposal. 
A sumrnary of the oreceding pros and cons \-las presented 
feature noted in the results of the Slli""VSY ,,,as the 
fact that of those who felt their business 1>l'ould be hurt by 
tho James River Improvement, there was an apparent 100 per 
. ,. t '" I
cent correlation th thoir r8_1 OpposItIon .owaro ~ne 
~mrrovoment; of those o would expect improved business, an 
Ilppnrent 1 per cent correlation in their':enoral sunport of 
",., t~ '.·Ll".O'~c,'..';te(.~, t.h.,er'B, betho project existed. U t . II 0 so',; I.1 0 . -'- ' " -'\,r01.110.:- .. 
six favored 2nd six opposed, inno offect 'pon thoir bus 
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TABLE VIII 
MAJOR OPINIONS FAVORING AND OPPOSING 
JANES Rr VER H1PR OVEIvfENT
 
1967 SURVEY
 
Arguments in favor: 
1. Economic jUBtification--Benefit-cost ratio exceeds 
unity. 
2. Strengthen Virginia's economy, particularly Rich­
mond, Petersburg, and Hopewell area. 
3. Insignificant diversion of traffic from Hampton 
Roads with a long-range increase in Hampton Roads traffic. 
4. Lower James River Basin would be opened to exten­
s i ve ind us tri al deve lopment; aaequa te waterfront sf tes are 
no longer available at Hampton Roads. 
5. Diversion of Virginia products that are nm,!
 
exported from Baltimore back to Richmond.
 
6" Increase in imports --to support i nereased indus try 
--v:ould help balance Virginia's imports "Ii th exports. 
7. Generation of additional ocean traffic through all 
ports on ton Roads, as well as Richmond. 
8. Increased "av-rareness" of Virginia's port(s). 
9. Pre rentl a 1 fre ight rates to inland from port of 
Richmond would result in net increase in State's port trado. 
10. D ersion of North Carolina cargoes to II new lt 
Vir~r\ln:ta	 port (Hichmond)--that trade nor;;ally handled at 
rehead C i , North Carol ina. 
l. Excess i vo d ivers1 on of cargo from Hampton Roads to 
Hie tUrJond with little advantage. 
'J 
t. • Tho improvement 18 not necease to trade pr 0L~re s s 
/Bnd/or t re would be little effect on such ogr(~ss • 
a
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TABLE VIII (continued) 
:2:.rgument sin appos i ti on (c ant. ) : 
3. Funds could be better invested in improvements 
to Hampton Roads, where needs still prevail. 
4. Excessive additional State expenditures would be 
required to develop Richmond harbor. 
5'. Pre sen t 0 verland fre ight carriers would suffer. 
6. Would result in fragmentation of port develop­
ment through diffusion of available State funds. 
7. Economic justification "gone 't since pipelines 
now carry petroleum products to Richmond. 
8. Di vis i on of effort in solie i tation of trade 
between more ports would weaken results of this effort. 
9. Channel utilization has never been significant 
in the past to warrant additional improvement. 
10. Containerization concept will render the im­
proved channel obsolete before long. 
11. $~O million cost not realistically high enough 
to pay for project and maintenance. 
c 
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general, the improvement. Therefore, a high degree of bias 
inevitably existed in the response; this was not only expected, 
but was s01ici ted in hopes of bringing out diverse opinions on 
the subject. Nevertheless, both proponents and opponents con­
tributed comment to ooth sides of the issue in many cases, as 
did particularly those reported to be directly uneffected by 
the improvement. 
To conclude, the objectives of the survey--to obtain 
opin i onated v iewpo ints --1tJere succes sfully achieved. Although 
the survey sampling may have been somewhBt limited in scope 
and the information something less than revolutionary, this 
phase of the project reconfirmed much of the current feelings. 
Nevertheless, the feelings were perhaps not very strong, for 
only three indicated that they planned to actively promote and 
1 
fi ve to prevent the improvement to the extent they could. ,-
VIe A SlJ RY AND SONE LUST ONS- -JAI1:ES 
HIVER H1PROVElI1ENT 
Sine e th e leg is la ti on in 1961-1 call ing for numerous 
roports and General Assembly review, progress was relatively 
' 'bJ t·"l l' 1 0/.0/ 6., Hhen orr,wnizations nreparing theDep: l H'.l.
,-' 
,e tm 'I ~a ta ~ 
'-...... 
pen dA lng' t ,cogan .• c~ statements relative toe·l_.aaB1·n~?: theirrapor ,8 1- yo ­
thefi.nd in s. December 20, 1966, the joint findings of 
J1'h' '" . q 'Ie)l' "'ed on the tHenty-four ,.;ho completed tho 
,1..0 1" ",Clc' ". t'on r->ly others 
Sur" /] Y n (:> '" ~ f']' c q ]1 'f Hn s l-Je r 1D i; t h 1 S e s ,1 ., ..' ',' -- '. J _.)Q 
Y'. , ""'f ;\.J I, -, J~--'---J _ _ _ --. _ _ t'orrr \Der S8, 
not answerin the survey nor comnlet .. 
wIll actively onposc or promote the 
•
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Virginia Insti tute of Narine Science and the State. Fisheries 
Commission were presented to Governor Mills E. Godwin. 
Though the Commission refrained from final approval of the 
improvement--pending establishment of controls it wanted 
before dredging could begin, Governor Godwin hailed the 
reports: "I believe the ma~or obstacles have been mounted 
and a green light has been flashed;"l Fisheries Commission 
Director Jv1ilton 'r. Hickman concurred. 2 January 18, 1967, 
the State Highway Commission reported the project would have 
no adverse effects on any existing or future bridges on the 
River. The Virginia State Ports Authority, on record as pro­
moting the project, was expected to report favorably, as 
were the other State bodies called upon by the 1964 Assembly. 
C. J. Robin, Norfolk District Chief Engineer, Corps of 
Army Engineers, reported in January, 1967, that he was not 
antic ipating any action by his office until the project re­
ceived approval of the General Assembly in 1968. If their 
action is favorable, he said that he would then attempt to 
1 
obtain funds to make a new economic evaluation.--' 
itlhe re did th is leave the James Hi ver Improvement? 
AccordinG to Governor Godwin in late 1966, the project had a 
"Green 11gbt ll upon the receipt of the State Fisheries Commis­
. I d the results of the model study andSlon s approval base on ­v_ 
Gate to JamesIe i ted in Georr;re H. Kelley, tfStud ie s Open 
1966, PP. 1,Hiver SOalfJa'rJ, II _'rhe_ Vi~p'inian-Pilot, December 21, .. ..~-~~._-
,:
') 
I ill d • 
3NOWB item in tho 
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the Virginia Marine Institute Study. Though their conclu­
sions could have been considered irrelevant to the 
. purpose 
here, all reports 80on-to-be-due to the governor were ex­
pected to be approving in nature. However, a long line of 
obscure political maneuvers based on sectional interests 
managed to hold Richmond f S "porthood" status quo for nearly 
two decades since completion of the "Existing Project" in 
1947. 
First was the actual recognition of the desire for an 
increased depth by Congressional approval for a survey in 
1954-55--a delay of six to seven years in itself. Next came 
the long study of the Corps of Rngineers, blocked for two 
years in 1958 by demands to consider the model study question 
relative to the oyster threat. Though the Norfolk District 
Corps of Engineers survey was reported to be !tready for typ­
1o ng.• 1n0 1058 th not it for!f / , .ey did submit revie,,] until 1960-­
not because the model study had assured the safety of the 
oyster beds, but because the opinions of enough experts had 
concurred that no threat existed. It was not until 1962 that 
tho HeviA;.J Heport t.Jas made public. The Congressional approval 
of the report was relatively quick but required the aoproval 
°th O years However, in thepoof V g :i n i a t s !S0 VB I'n 0 r 'VJl. 1 n 1	 1 ve • 
r, tl had stvm;"ri the improve­rneantimo J the Virginia Genera_1 .'1.ssern Ly . v·l-'C~. 
mont by tho law calling for Fisheries Commission approval of 
0+ to Virc;:inia's
a ster-bod	 The frustraulonresultantdrod~ing. 
ovornors led to ~"tseveral Ollors, ·1·. n "cl·1o'inp....,II -, • tho establishment 
or tho coY]clusivo--but re tiVf:)ly o Jineffectlve-­ ames 1);,-,1""LV". 
C,·
oJ t u d.v Corrnn Ls s i on t' eo or t , ttl yt nrc, ,00 ,\, t h,.',' 0 11 '.l'.. h . '. 1 1' toe 0 mD 1 t) t e • 
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ThouO'h lOiZisla tion subsequent to the "Study R t" 
o -' , epor removed 
the veto power from the Fisheries Commission--perhaps a 
major breakthrough in i tself--it also led to the requirement 
for subsequent reporting and legislation that was in its 
fourth year of a four-year process at the time of this 
writing. 
The State reports, to be followed by action of the 
General Assembly, were designed to decide the issue in 1968-­
once -and -for-a 11 c Hovlever, other changes in the pa s t few 
years completely shattered the original benefit-cost justifi­
cation for the Federal proposal. The result was a need for a 
completely new review for economic justification, which will 
definitely await an affirmative decision by the General 
As sembly in 1968, ae cord Lng to the Corps of Engineers t"ho 
1
wi 11 make the evalua ti on" ~ 
Thus, it appeared in mid-196? that the fol101<Jing 
chronology, with estimates of timing, will be required: 
Ie A decision by the 1968 Virginia General Assembly to 
approve or reject the James River dredging concept 
• estimated action date--May, 1968. 
2. Assw~ing an affirmative decision by the Assembly, 
efforts	 by Corps of Engineers to obtain funds for 
, estimated apD_pova1a new feasibility stuay ••• 
6 ')date--November, 19 D. 
1 
Ib :l_d • 
107
 
3" Assuming funds are provided for a CorDs study 
,	 . , 
performance of the new feasibility study .•• 
estimated completion--one year, or November, 1969. 
4.	 Since the five-year deadline for Virginia governorfs 
project approval will have expired, the new study 
may go through the two years of Federal review and 
final approval by Congress (as between 1960 and 
1962) ..• estimated approval date--conservative1y, 
Janua ry 1, 1971. 
5.	 Addi tional State acceptance of Federal proposal? 
Barring tha t, actual construction \rJOrk--allowing 
six months for rece ipt of bids Bnd issuing of con­
tracts for initial stages ..• estimated work start 
date--July 1,. 1971. 
6.	 Completion of Project Improvement, based on previous 
estimates of five to six years--1976 or 1977--up to 
ten years efter this writing. 
The precod-tnG timetable, subject to scrutiny but attempting 
conservatism, made claims of obsolescence of a James River 
channel only thirty-five feet deep less doubtful each day. 
1\,1 1 l>J h·' ch· deservesne'&-J pr'oposa~, IJ. introduction before 
closin 
'New only to this 
1 7, cl08cril'od it H8 
earlier by Richmond 
pi tI'nffic. 
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in 8. letter from the Tidewater Virginia Development Council 
(TVDC) • The TVDC proposal, perhaps the result of recogni­
tion of the nearness of the five-year deadll'ne f
- or the State, 
presented the following points: 
1.	 The Plan would provide unlimited water to political 
subdi vi si ons bet'ltJeen Norfolk and Richmond, popu­
lation of which would reach three million by the 
year 2000 (now l~ million). 
2 0 The Plan 1,rJould provide an unlimited raw \vater supply 
for industry on both sides of the river from 
Richmond to Norfolk. 
3.	 The Plan would increase by up to ten feet the depth 
of the JameS upstream to Richmond, eliminating 
much of the need for proposed dredging. 
11. An additional river crossing vlauld be provided by 
the Plan, eliminating a ferry now provided.-1 
The "Plan ll of the TVDC was the construction of a "tidal exclu­
sian dam" across the James near or above the site of JarnBstOhTn 
Island. The Plan would provide B barrier between fresh water 
above and salt v'Jater oolow the dam, raising the upstream side 
' .	 d 1 1 f d . -n The D_, roposal ,",jas presentedb>Y t he d eSlre _eve 0 eSl~o' 
as ono Hhtch l,vould pay for i,tself throu:~h t.Jater sales, traffic 
Traffic tolls wouldtolls, !'md Dresumed FedeI'sl sponsorship.
 
The letter of oro­be from use of a hi~hway across the dam. 
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posal for the dam Plan closed with the statement that: 
d fa?~hmOtn(hj.isplentithled to first class port facilities an, vH u ,l~ an t e factli ti es fa!] such traffic 
HOtlld be avallable and should be so. ~ 
The TVDC also proposed the Plan to the Corps of Army 
Engineers, urging its inclusion in considerations of future 
? 
River improvement.~ Needless to say, the entire idea was 
met with mixed reaction. E. B. Pendleton, Jr., House Dele­
gate from Richmond-Henrico County called the dam a new scheme 
to block the James If new body in an old shroud. "improvement--a "" J 
He stated: 
For years, our Tidewater neighbors, led by Norfolk 
interests, have brought forth skeletons, red herrings 
and every other real or make-believe obstacle that 
Hould prefent the dredging of a 35-foot channel to 
Ric hmond.+ 
Other reports from Richmond cited that interests there were 
5
soeking a quick study of the darn. One Richrnond Chamber of 
f""· lit do noth 'n"Comrnerc e spoke sman ur d the Coros 0 f,nglneerso ~ c. 1-L<6 
, 
b 
that will stand in the way • • .!I of deepening the channeL 
Y- • J n· 'Y""a Tn_st.j+llte of HarineDr. ;'.Jil1iam J • dargIS, r., vlrgl"l - u_ 
C" " '," IIS"lch" ""'" l-fou1d create a sal ine barrier detri­
..) C 1 e nc e sal (, , '-, _' 1:1 ~''J a"'~' ­
1 Ibid. 
2 l'n The Virginian-Pilot, (larch 4, 1967. vJ S item .. _.----,,----­~~--_
.' p·lot February 28, 1967.item in 'rho Virgl n~an-L l~ '" ' 
rch 25 t 1967 
, 'T',. ho Virfdn"ian-~ilot, In ­
. d ' ' T~l'"t, '-', ho'olq Cl.te' 1n •. t,f'i ~ _i--'." - -'­• .T ()hn de,.. , 
]V:111'chlO,1 7. 
mental to the Virginia 
2da.m .. 
Though the dam 
it has 
roore··· Y6a r s to 
1@6 ..107 • 
.-, 
'::'Ibid,. 
Plan may haY€lill~);>i'to'Ver tU$'lo11g:rtl.ll:, 
already touched ·~irfdebAte"th~1:;;in~Y1.1~i';!i;"aqa;Caevert>ai 
t he hypobhe ttce,1··t'lpfettaib[~; .• FlP~'B~tit~&jctm.'Pg.g"€lS 
2 
CHAPTER IV 
301'1E ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF INTRA-STATE RIVALRIES 
What was the significance of the Fall Line Blockade 
as it related to the current proposal to deepen the James 
River to Richmond? The greatest importance lay in the 
defini te pa rallel isms between th e two sub jects, sin ce these 
served to indicate msic weaknesses in the political processes 
of the State as they are applied in urgent economic programs-­
both past and present. 
Since the likenesses between the tHO questions seem to 
exceed the d i fferenees, it served to firs t di spense Hith the 
latter. The primary differences faced by the Fall Line Block­
ade and the Jame s River Improvemen t were those of time and 
detail of physical orientation. The element of time was 
clearly differentiated :in Chapters II and III, the earlier 
"blockado" ara ending abou.t a century before the beginning of 
rigorous inquiry into the improvement of the James. Hm"ever, 
it \.Jas cl ear tha t time played Ii ttle significance in chang­
ing m0 s t of t he basic iss uesinvolve d • 
Regarding the ograpby of the tHO issues, the earlier 
"blockade" '{<Ias 10,,"16red upon Hampton Roads by inland interests, 
..... ltbl 1· d "The curren" . ~oc,{a, econterec3 at Fiichmond and Petersburg. 
against Richmond by Hampton Roads, essen­has been directed 
of involvementIy8 V e r t h 81e s s, t oe areatially B revorse. . I 
transport a t ion ro uta s behJoenrernnined ossentially th 088 
tho 
the Fall Line cities.runton Ronds cities 
pas 
change was the modes of tranSpl 
roads inland from Hampton Road~ 
tion channel to Richmond. 
The question seemed to ] 
development be placed--at the 1 
or toward the hopeful devel qpUH 
the James River downstream frrn 
characteristics throughout. A: 
crucial question relative to tl 
Virginia, the scope of even thl 
unbasic. The really essential 
crucial to many lrJalks of public 
shipping, economic growth and 1 
should have been asked relativl 
sectionalism, petty local jeal( 
sive plEL'1uing, pay-as-you-go f: 
misplaced objectives, obsolescl 
inter-re tionships of these cc 
deep-rooted p lems of Virgi!Y 
in programs as urgent as the dl 
of t State. 
To exemplify soma of thE 
,. d::ub je at s al r'O s t,;Ud 10 , a loc 
the previously mentioned very ( 
oxamplE), Lh.e concept of mispla( 
ertenbnkor by mention of tho 1 
ApP:CJlllchinn rn nns of H canE 
u 
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wi th a near-blindness to the needs of Hampton Roads for rapid, 
effective development of access to the inland •. Comparatively, 
an article in September, 1966, related the squabble taking 
place in the U. S. Congress between Representative Porter 
Hardy (Norfolk) and others from Texas, MarYland, and Penn­
sylvania as to v.lhose port (Norfolk, Houston, Baltimore, or 
Philadelphia) could lay claim to the number two snot in 
, . 
1 
fore ign tonnage. One hoped such leg isla t ive opportunity 
had been better spent in the seeking of funds for worthwhile 
port improvement appropriation o 
We were among the first to enter upon a system of 
improvement with a view to develop our great and varied 
resources, but our efforts were misdirected and our 
means so misapplied that we were among the la2t to accomplish any great practical result •.•. 
The preceding was written in 1856 relative to the Fall Line 
Blockade, although it may have become the type of news article 
the t vJi 11 te read fifteen or twenty years from nOH \-Ji th re­
saect to the current James River issue. 
As for tradition, the Appalachian canal was plagued by 
the tT"aditions of Goorge VJashington IS dreams and the denial 
- Th.'" tre~·l·.t;onp.l_. reluctl''!Dce to furtherd 1 . .DUo f f Bora.1 p~annlng. - ­
J ~:Hne s Ht vor Imnrovoment has been bl inded by belief the t 
liichrnond could not handle the demands for facilities required 
4 .. 1 "',.' It ·l'\,lorfo.l.. k 1 S CIa i m H s No. 2 Port
olen nIL.t~" . .,., ·t. b·.. 1'" 1966. 
p , ,,1 d L' v' H n r (1 v II LA d (t e r -Star, Ge p .e rn ;8 r ... c , Vi or'ous ulJnt") _' ~,) _Lc::..,dJ' ~V':;:'·j.:;;,A~ 
176 citim~ the (Norfolk)p. --L J '--..-'I 
A 
OD. 
---'­
& 
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by the improvement. The firmly "entrenched faith in pay-as­
. . III th 
you-go flnanc lng, at has hindered Virginia's development 
of good educe t ion a t all levels, also aske d: Whel"e Hould 
the State get funds to develop the Richroond harbol" and the 
banks of the James? An excellent analogy to the "Hho-gets-
II 
the-part-funds question appeared in a recent editorial on 
the competition for water resources in the Hampton Roads area. 
Inter-city disputes over 1rlater rights had grown so vehement 
that by September, 1966, the basic urgency of Hater for 
existence--like the source of many old mountain feuds--had 
been en ti re ly 10 st in the squabble. 2 It appeared that in 
the feud to retain the handling of a feH ships full of 
commerce--bound for Richmond anyway, sight had been lost of 
the possibility of making available potentially needed 
industrial sites to the apparent long-range good of the 
Sta to -8. s -a -Hho le • Sigh t also ~-Jas los t of t he long-range 
good that could c orne to Hampton Hoads through increased 
OXPOSUT'8 of industry-oriented port commerce • These elements 
. '~""~'" t'o "l'.'.·ot"h If.'l'p,D,laced objectives and tradi­commentary, relBtl \~ . .. - _ 
ti onal c~onc()pts .. 
i tional feuding bet",een Eampton Roads andThe tr 
. t ·.l~ ~'e'a' t'~d 1.;ith the conceptsso In e '-1 .1' OJ ,. ~ - •Richmond in both eras WBS 
!l t 
1 itorinl in the 
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of sectionalism and petty local jealousies as to be 
nearly 
unseparable, though their extreme prevalence deserved 
descriptive use here. Herein, one has visualized the waste 
of years through traditional hesitancy toward economic change, 
economic progressJ 
Perhaps the most significant failing of Virginia 
a IV-Jays ha s lain in the traditional refusal of comprehens i ve 
planning on a Statewide basis. It has been as if in reject­
ing National planning in the eighteenth century Virginian 
legislators had rejected--for all time--any form of planning 
and assistance in seeking intra-State cooperation for State­
wide progress, thereby leaving decisions--or lack of decisions 
--to the degeneration of iealous local entities. In refer­
ence to earlier failings in internal improvements of Virginia, 
Goodri ct 1f.Jrote that a significant part of the explanation 
• lies in the inherent contradiction between a 
system of order grants-in-aid to local enterprise 
a~d the concentrat{on of funds and effort required 
for the acconmlishrnent of a major developmental 
,,<Jork • • "I ' 
r< t' 1 "'t t ,'-'p"nator t.,ip,nY"r E. Emlell. Jr., (Norfolk)GOmpBrB~lV8~y, 0 a 8 w. -. --J • 
381d in May, 1967: 
Vir,7jnia has suffered because its government~l _ 
c_ " I r::> n,~f"!'1ed to enCYBae ln arlITIf''~1f:i'')1''''t~1 f'or I')(-"yrs'tlons (lQVu LV_UL,.."· ..< -0 t~ _. .J 
.. " '.<,. t" " '- . ': • . " h educated 
1 nnrt-te-rm \"'1 ann1nr;r If He contInue to c.B l'un '. 
J',~ U •• , t~~·'~._L~ o· t".,'tv.·C' Dlanni for tbe 
'.,'1 t'h r'B"Dcc'ct to the ossenL:Ll J 01 , 'h 
' -, -, ", -1' t to ~ C>J 
h v't','he 1'8" <',,It''' 8.Y'O ing to be ulsasrous ...,l. ~~ 1 U t 11 r (-) , " n' ,A ~ c. • -.,:> "- ' ..
;<'t;on Rn t1 f'\'tnr p nerl.'lL.IOnS.~\..J(] 1. fare of our ener ct ,... • <_. ~.< • ~C. 
Drevai.ledComDrehensive DIannd concopts of long , . , 
J n" " " 't' D. 101.uc)OeJr'1.Ch , e .£,l..:..' 
an-Pilot, M0Y "7, 1 '7 ! • 
1l;6 
. two decades before thim·, Wl'liting.Si~;~.".;J.1J.~5tbJil;j~*;-~~~rSI. a, 
asci.sion by the State on the Jameg.;a· ... ... '.' ..' 
... ··.··.·.··il;W.~.I'.t!1l'lproy.e};'('~~·t,..,..eithe.r 
favorable or unfavorable wou4,.Q have.1::JeA n. '.' t t... ...•..•..........................•.
 
.' ..... .... '" ...ara. 11~il".a~t:0tt1a.t:I.e 
one, memy years old ~ Bu.t without'Pla.n..o!!:L~:lntea.e.I'lt.et'ia for 
such aeci s ion-making, VirginianstJ,avE:lf'a.~lf1l;G tip move i.p;qny 
direction .. 
In the meantime I other states have emba.vkedonmajor 
long-range port development pvogr~s.. The ,New York Ma.rine 
and Avis. tion Department was reported in 1961 to be conducting 
an economic survey of the port potential to the year 2000 to 
provide a basis for long-range comprehensive planning. 
Philadelphia 1'11aS under a master plan for port development in 
1961~ Baltimore reportedly lias underway with a fav"'reaching 
program for harbor development for the movement of both 
1general and special izad cargoes. However I in Virginia not 
only 1018re e cities of Hampton Roads--hunting for industrial 
space themse Ives--suc cessfully lIblockadinglt the James River 
ovement, but the Hampton Roads cities i·lere seeking to 
block improvements of each other in such areas as obtaining 
State funds for development of container port facilities and 
disputi the Il r ights" of one of the port cities to Hin the 
bid as t of call by a containership syndicate over the 
h 2 In the questionscholee of another location i.Jithin t. e area. 
,.., nt'le'T OD cit .. , up.lSmith, Amundsen, and De J, ......... _ c
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of port development, metropolitan areas of Virginia seemed to 
leave a great deal of room for improvement. It appeared to 
this v-Jriter that the answer may lie in the strengthening of 
the Itauthority" of the Virginia State Ports Authority. 
~De of the prime detrimental outcomes of such policy-­
or lack of it--has been obsolescence of huge, costly programs 
prior to their completion. Efforts to continue the James 
Ri v ar and Kanawha Cana I ~'lere sustained deep into this n Deriod 
,. 
of obsoles cence, II taking a heavy toll on the net improvement 
of transportation facilities within the State.} 
To conclUde, the preceding paragraph precisely described 
the fast approaching status of the James River Project Improve­
ment • Through the ravages of sectionalism and petty 
jealous i es and the lac k of comprehensiVB long-range planning 
deep-seated in the traditions of colonial times, the obso­
lescence of the James Improvement has grovm close at hand. 
It 1tJouId do ".vel] for Vire;lnin and its cities to recognize this, 
rise ave tho al~pay of misconceptions bred in disunity, and 
reach 8 de reo of reasonable expediency with regards to the 
-iHmY'ovement Brld other future important issues. 
1 
r1 ch, ., p. 100. 
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!EXf/IBIT 17 
1717 Harmon Street, #202­
Norfolk, Virginia 23518 
January 23, 1967 
(inside address) 
Dear Sir: 
Attached is a survey form, the information for which I am solicitipg for use 
in a thesis for a Master of Arts degree in Economics at Drake University 
Des Moines, Iowa. The thesis is intended to determine if parallelisms erlst 
between the proposed James Hiver Channel Deepening Proj ect and the alleged 
determent of Virginia I s transportation growth by inland-oriented legisla-­
tuxes prior to 1860. 
Though this information is solicited for my immediate use, it \oIould appear 
that the results could lead to much greater benefit for those more directly 
operating within the transportation fields. Therefore, in the anticipa.tion 
that this study might contribute something of value to the questions surround­
ing the James River Project, I sincerely hope you will take the time neces­
sary for completing and returning the form. 
You may feel some question(s) is not related to you or your interests; if so, 
please place an "X" through such questions to so indicate. The text of the 
pa.per is not intended to relate to you or your firm's name (that is, general 
reference will be made to industries or types of organizations rather than 
to organization names). 
Opinions are anticipated in this survey. This is why a large number of 
diversified organizations concerned with the subject are being contacted. 
Where questions suggest, inclusion of any factual information on which your 
opinions are based 'Would be helpful. If space provided is inadequate, use 
the back of the form or additiona.! sheets to expand your information if you 
wish. 
I will not ask "pl ea.se take a few seconds of your time ..• "; you may feel that 
your interest in these questions caLls for some research or contemplation. 
Such interest on your part would be mutually valuable. However, I have tried 
to make the questions general enough, based on recent news media information, 
that perhaps you are prepared to answer with a minimum of effort. 
As al'Ways, time presents limitations on all such projects. At the risk of 
appearing over-anxious, may I request that you or one of your qualified. per­
sonnel attempt to complete and return the form no later than January 317 
Your concern for this Bubject and generosity vith your time in responding 
to thi 8 inquiry will be most appreciated. Thank you. 
81: Robert J. Thompson 
------
------
----------
--------
--
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JAMES RIVER DEVELoPMENT PROJECT --- SURVEY I£XRIBITIl] 
1. YOUR NAME	 YOUR POSITION 
2.	 YOUR COMPANY'S NAME OOMPANY" S ADDRESS
3.	 NATURE OF YOUR COHPANY'S BUSINESS 
4.	 TERRITORY (or jurisdiction) OF YOUR COMPANY 
5.	 ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THE PROPOSED DEEPENING OF THE JAMES RIVER TO 
FACILITATE RIVER INDUSTRIALIZATION AND TO I.MPROVE lUCID'JOND ASe AN 
INLAND PORT? 
YES _ NO TO WHAT EXTENT? 
NEWSPAPER INFOfu~TION 
DISCUSSIONS ------­
WORK-RELATED STUDIES 
NON\-K)PJ( .. RELATED STUDy·------­
OTHER ~~-~--~------6.	 Anticipated effect of the James River Project on your business: 
Improve it No Effect Hurt it
 
Please explain your answer specifically:
 
7.	 What long-range effect do you expect the project will have on the 
port(s) of Hampton Roads? 
Improve it No Effect __ Hurt it
 
Please explain your answer sped. flcaHy;
 
8.	 What long-range effect do you expect the project will bave on the 
overall import-export trade of Virginia? 
Improve it No Effect Hurt it
 
Please e.xplain your answer specifically:
 
9.	 Hark the answer(s) that indicate what you think will be the long­
:range outstanding feature( s) of spending the funds specified for the 
Jat.1es River improvement (about $40 million): 
_a. Necessary for the advancement of Virginia'. trade. 
_b. Hill benefit Richmond lind Virginia. without effecting Hampton 
Roads.	 .'
_Co. lUll benefit Richmond and Virginia at the expense (loss) of 
Hampton R.£>ll.d s. 
_d. Will benefit Richmond and the James River development, but at 
the expense of Hampton Roads ~ Vi rginia. 
_e.	 \';ould better meet the needs of Virginia by placing the invest­
ment in further improvement of Hampton Roads instead of the 
James River. 
_____f.	 Other (or expansion of above): 
•
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EXHIB1TD 
(CO NT.) 
10. Are you familiar with the history of transportation in ViJ:\gi.nia. 
particularly that conflict that Thomas: J. Wertenbaker describes as 
uThe Fall..Line Blockadeu in Norfolk: Historic Southern Port?* This 
uHblockade was alleged to be the retardation of the development of 
railroads between Hampton Roads and the interior of Virginiapr.1or ' 
to 1860, based on Utraoe rivalry" from the Interiorcities: .0£ 
Virginia (aU according to Wertenbaker).
 
Yes. I do know 0 f the conflict _
 
No, I have not heard of it _
 
11. Do you feel there is a <'orrelation between early efforts to d.evelop 
inland Virginia ports (i. e •• Wertenbakerts uBlockade'*) and the 
proposed James Ri.ver Channel Improvement relative to long-range 
growth of Virginia' 8 maritime trade? 
No.1 see no correlation _ 
Yes t there is definite correlation If Styes" is 
your answer. please describe in what way: 
12.	 Do you (or does your organization) plan to actively promote Cyes_ 
no ) or try to prevent (yes_no_> the James River Project? 
In~t way? 
13. Other comments: 
bo·ok	 ~8 .... V"'~.l"'bl· 6· from the Norfolk Public Library at*Wertenbaker t 6 'D uL	 U,," 
$1.00. 
12 
jEXH/B/T m7 127 
1717 Harmon street, #202 
Norfolk, Virginia 23518 
March 13, 1967 
.. 
,,, . 
Dear Sir: 
Reviewing the results of ~ current survey on the James River Proposal, 
I regret to find that your form is not among those returned. Perhaps 
the questionaire did not reach you. 
Your participation and interest in this survey is considered most impor­
tant; your opinions on the subj ect would be valuable. Please review 
the attached material and forward the form at your earliest convenience 
(if possible, by March 31). Do not feel you must answer questions of 
a confidential nature • 
• 
Thank you. 
Sincerely, 
Robert J. Thompson 
